Cheerskep,
> No, my response does not depend on words "having meanings". It depends on > your reading my scriptions and retrieving the associations in your mind. > Why isn't that simply meaning then? Why would this not produce a functional account of 'the meaning of xxx'? After all, it will produce the appropriate inferential relations that allow people to keep track of one another's usages, correct one another, and point out contradictions, etc. Brandom has been working out a theory of meaning in this vein for nearly 20 years now. Why do you insist in equating 'meaning' with definite descriptions and the like instead of (1) a cluster-concept theory or disjunctive definition, or (2) an inferentialist account of language use, or (3) a pragmatic approach to contexts of us, or even (4) a causal, kripkean acount for singular terms? You are simply attacking a specific theory of meaning, as it it were the ONLY theory out there (in point of fact, I take you to be constructing strawmen to boot). It does not follow in the least that simply because (some version of) a realist theory of meaning fail, ALL theories fail. Regarldess, you still haven't shown that any specific realist theory fails. You ave simply asserted it, along with a couple of claims about 'learning' etc, that our best cognitive models of language acquisition would seem to confute entirely. So everything remains at the level of assertion and suspicion. If you feel that no one really believes this way, that I am parodying a > non-existent position, that no one believes in a "third substance" (after > materiality and consciousness) I refer you to the (very poor) Wikipedia > entry for > 'pragmatics', where you will find phrases like these: "As defined in > linguistics, a sentence is an abstract entity "a string of > words divorced from non-linguistic context" as opposed to an utterance, > which is a concrete example of a speech act in a specific context." > We are all familiar with ideal-types (propositions in this case). There is nothing spooky here at all. You are simply reading what you want into the passage (i.e. 'abstract' = spooky platonic entity). In any case, I understand that you are deeply committed to your theory, It just does not strike me as helpful in the least. As I have said, and illustrated to my satisfaction, it is question begging. I have yet to see you respond to these criticisms. Everything you have said here so far does not mitigate my initial criticism, nor does it offer any further warrant for making your basic claims. On Thu, Jul 15, 2010 at 4:09 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Imago writes: > > Your response relies upon the 'meanings' of words (whatever that may be), > > > and the material implications they make possible.B You are > presupposing > > > what > > > you deny. > > > My whole position will/would take pages, so these short responses are > inended only to suggest, not demonstrate irresistibly. > > No, my response does not depend on words "having meanings". It depends on > your reading my scriptions and retrieving the associations in your mind. We > have both long been conditioned by similar juxtapositions of words with > images, feelings, ideas, so when I say 'Eiffel Tower' or 'hungry' or > 'milk', I > feel confident you have long associated each word with images/notions > roughly > like those I have also piled up in my memory. If a shepherd in the Andes > saw > my words on paper, he'd have no gush of retrieved memories in his mind. > If I utter 'apelsin' to him, the only thing arising in his consciousness > will > be the sound of the word (and perhaps some dire thoughts about why I'm > bothering him with gibberish). But if I say 'apelsin' to a Swede, it will > occasion memories of oranges because all his life that word has been > juxtaposed > with the images, tastes, etc of the fruit. It is not the case that the > Swede > somehow has access to the "external realm" of abstract entities -- > "meanings" -- that the shepherd does not. > > If you feel that no one really believes this way, that I am parodying a > non-existent position, that no one believes in a "third substance" (after > materiality and consciousness) I refer you to the (very poor) Wikipedia > entry for > 'pragmatics', where you will find phrases like these: > > "As defined in linguistics, a sentence is an abstract entity b a string of > words divorced from non-linguistic context b as opposed to an utterance, > which is a concrete example of a speech act in a specific context." > > "it rejected [Saussure's] notion that all meaning comes from signs existing > purely in the abstract space of langue." > > I do recommend you try the reductio ad absurdum of imagining just how a > given utterance acquires the mind-independent abstract entity you'd call > its > "meaning". Association accounts for whatever "communication" takes place; > assuming the existence of a mind-independent realm of quasi-Platonic > abstract > entities does not.
