> All words have metaphorical uses. > Yes, certainly, Mr Conger. I actually believe that metaphor is an important and fascinating issue. Metaphors tend to come before proper concepts in most cases, and some are literalized (table leg, river bed, etc).
I do not want to seem overly harsh, either. It is simply that this particular line of argument has been circulating for some time, and it is perhaps appropriate to lodge a few criticisms. Cheerskep's argument will be much better for it in the end. On Thu, Jul 15, 2010 at 6:24 PM, William Conger <[email protected]>wrote: > Don't go too far, Imago. All words have metaphorical uses. > wc > > > ----- Original Message ---- > From: imago Asthetik <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Sent: Thu, July 15, 2010 5:19:30 PM > Subject: Re: Invalidity of Cheerskep's Argument > > > Do you find nothing at all about it that's acceptable? > > > > No I do not. > > Your claim is not even about the phenomenon of meaning, but about > individual > psychology. And you are trying to move from a psychological claim > pertaining to how you assume my mind works (based on introspection of your > own, I assume), to a general metaphysical claim about minds in general. > You > cannot validly do this. Nor would a valid psychological conclusion about > associations between languages tell you much about meaning in general, > since > it presupposes the notion of meaning. Finally, what my mind associates > with > a term does not prevent me from using it in a correct way (correctness of > use seems to be the standard for 'meaning'). So all things told, you are > grounding your example in altogether the wrong phenomenon. Why do you > insist that associations are images in my head anyway? > > You are furthermore conflating a context of learning (semantic acquisition) > with meaning itself. Your use of misdirection trades on this. And as > people like Fodor have illustrated, language acquisition presupposes > meaning. The reverse is incoherent. As is the idea that things can be > associated with other things independently of meaning, broadly construed -- > there would only be a chaotic jumple, not even association unless you could > pick out meaningful similarities, and categorisations. > > > > On Thu, Jul 15, 2010 at 5:56 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Imago writes: > > > > > I simply don't see how words can have associations but not meanings. > > > This > > > sentence is sophistical. > > > > > Suppose I pick up an apple and display it while saying, Apelsin! > > [ah-pel-seen] Apelsin! Apelsin! An hour from now, if I say to you > > "apelsin", > > the sound > > will remind you of the apple-image you now connect with the sound. Kids > get > > conditioned the same way when we say, "Milk!" "Hot!" "Good boy!" "No!" > Say > > "No!" to a child enough, and he'll get your idea. This is what's > happening > > when someone "learns a language". He's not learning any "the meanings > of". > > He > > is being conditioned by the juxtaposition of certain sounds with certain > > images, feelings, ideas in his head. > > > > Now a confession. I just misled you: When you utter, "Apelsin!" to a > Swede, > > the image that comes to his mind is not of an apple; it's the image of an > > orange. You probably thought you were learning "the meaning of" a Swedish > > word. I misled, but not about an alleged mind-independent "meaning" - > only > > about the conditioned workings of a Swedish mind. > > > > That's my effort to demonstrate how words can have associations but not > > [mind-independent] meanings. Do you find nothing at all about it that's > > acceptable?
