> Meaning is what we do with words - words do not contain the associations or > references - they are arbitrary sound or symbol constructs - this also why > works of art do not mean - they merely can be made sense of - as such I as > the > sender of this missive intend meaning and have chosen my signifiers in > accord > with that intention - i.e. Having them interpreted in a given manner - I > do > this because I believe that I and my intended recipient (in this case you) > exist within a realm of shared experiences, references, and associations > or > at least to the degree that some sense will be made from what is written > here >
Pragmatics. On Thu, Jul 15, 2010 at 5:14 PM, Saul Ostrow <[email protected]> wrote: > Meaning is what we do with words - words do not contain the associations or > references - they are arbitrary sound or symbol constructs - this also why > works of art do not mean - they merely can be made sense of - as such I as > the > sender of this missive intend meaning and have chosen my signifiers in > accord > with that intention - i.e. Having them interpreted in a given manner - I > do > this because I believe that I and my intended recipient (in this case you) > exist within a realm of shared experiences, references, and associations > or > at least to the degree that some sense will be made from what is written > here > > > On 7/15/10 4:49 PM, "imago Asthetik" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Cheerskep, > > > > > No, my response does not depend on words "having meanings". It depends on > > your reading my scriptions and retrieving the associations in your mind. > > > > Why isn't that simply meaning then? Why would this not produce a > functional > account of 'the meaning of xxx'? After all, it will produce the > appropriate > inferential relations that allow people to keep track of one another's > usages, correct one another, and point out contradictions, etc. Brandom > has > been working out a theory of meaning in this vein for nearly 20 years now. > Why do you insist in equating 'meaning' with definite descriptions and the > like instead of (1) a cluster-concept theory or disjunctive definition, or > (2) an inferentialist account of language use, or (3) a pragmatic approach > to contexts of us, or even (4) a causal, kripkean acount for singular > terms? You are simply attacking a specific theory of meaning, as it it > were > the ONLY theory out there (in point of fact, I take you to be constructing > strawmen to boot). It does not follow in the least that simply because > (some version of) a realist theory of meaning fail, ALL theories fail. > Regarldess, you still haven't shown that any specific realist theory fails. > You ave simply asserted it, along with a couple of claims about 'learning' > etc, that our best cognitive models of language acquisition would seem to > confute entirely. So everything remains at the level of assertion and > suspicion. > > > If you feel that no one really believes this way, that I am parodying a > > non-existent position, that no one believes in a "third substance" (after > > materiality and consciousness) I refer you to the (very poor) Wikipedia > > entry for > > 'pragmatics', where you will find phrases like these: "As defined in > > linguistics, a sentence is an abstract entity "a string of > > words divorced from non-linguistic context" as opposed to an utterance, > > which is a concrete example of a speech act in a specific context." > > > > We are all familiar with ideal-types (propositions in this case). There is > nothing spooky here at all. You are simply reading what you want into the > passage (i.e. 'abstract' = spooky platonic entity). > > In any case, I understand that you are deeply committed to your theory, It > just does not strike me as helpful in the least. As I have said, and > illustrated to my satisfaction, it is question begging. I have yet to see > you respond to these criticisms. Everything you have said here so far does > not mitigate my initial criticism, nor does it offer any further warrant > for > making your basic claims. > > > On Thu, Jul 15, 2010 at 4:09 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Imago writes: > > > Your response relies upon the 'meanings' of words (whatever that may > be), > > > > and the material implications they make possible.B You are > > presupposing > > > > what > > > > you deny. > > > > > My whole position will/would take pages, so these short responses are > > inended only to suggest, not demonstrate irresistibly. > > > > No, my response does not depend on words "having meanings". It depends on > > your reading my scriptions and retrieving the associations in your mind. > We > > have both long been conditioned by similar juxtapositions of words with > > images, feelings, ideas, so when I say 'Eiffel Tower' or 'hungry' or > > 'milk', I > > feel confident you have long associated each word with images/notions > > roughly > > like those I have also piled up in my memory. If a shepherd in the Andes > > saw > > my words on paper, he'd have no gush of retrieved memories in his mind. > > If I utter 'apelsin' to him, the only thing arising in his consciousness > > will > > be the sound of the word (and perhaps some dire thoughts about why I'm > > bothering him with gibberish). But if I say 'apelsin' to a Swede, it > will > > occasion memories of oranges because all his life that word has been > > juxtaposed > > with the images, tastes, etc of the fruit. It is not the case that the > > Swede > > somehow has access to the "external realm" of abstract entities -- > > "meanings" -- that the shepherd does not. > > > > If you feel that no one really believes this way, that I am parodying a > > non-existent position, that no one believes in a "third substance" (after > > materiality and consciousness) I refer you to the (very poor) Wikipedia > > entry for > > 'pragmatics', where you will find phrases like these: > > > > "As defined in linguistics, a sentence is an abstract entity b a string > of > > words divorced from non-linguistic context b as opposed to an utterance, > > which is a concrete example of a speech act in a specific context." > > > > "it rejected [Saussure's] notion that all meaning comes from signs > existing > > purely in the abstract space of langue." > > > > I do recommend you try the reductio ad absurdum of imagining just how a > > given utterance acquires the mind-independent abstract entity you'd call > > its > > "meaning". Association accounts for whatever "communication" takes place; > > assuming the existence of a mind-independent realm of quasi-Platonic > > abstract > > entities does not. > > > > --
