There's an argument that to get a surer grasp on what Wittgenstein had in mind with 'heisst' in "Aber was heisst das?", it would be helpful to see how he uses it throughout PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS especially on the page where "Aber was heisst das?" appears. Presumably, P.I.'s translators, Anscombe and Rhees, did that, and by the time they'd finished the second edition they evidently thought they had it right (or as "right" as a translation can ever be).
Here (I hope) is the German, beginning with the sentence immediately before (without umlauts, and with caps for L.W.'s italics.): "Dieses hinweisende Lehren der Worter , kann man sagen, schlagt eine assoziative Verbindung zwischen dem Vort und dem Ding. Aber was heisst das? Nun, es kann Verschiedenes heissen; aber man denkt wohl zunachst daran, dass dem Kind das Bild des Dings vor die Seele tritt, wenn es das Vort hort. Aber wenn das nun geschieht,-- ist das der Zweck des Worts? Ja, es KANN der Zweck sein.Ich kann mir eine solche Verwendung von Wortern (Lautreihen) denken. (Das Aussprechen eines Wortes ist gleichsam ein Anschlagen einer Taste auf dem Vorstellungklavier. Aber in der Sprache im [Section] 2 ist es NICHT der Zweck der Worter, Vorstellungen zu erwecken. (Es kann freilich auch gefunden werden, dass dies dem eigentlichen Zweck forderlich ist.)" Anscombe and Rhees: "This ostensive teaching of words can be said to establish an association between the word and the thing. But what does this mean? Well, it can mean various things; but one very likely thinks first of all that a picture of the object comes before the child's mind when it hears the word. But now, if this does happen is that the purpose of the word? Yes, it CAN be the purpose I can imagine such a use of words (of series of sounds). (Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination.) But in the language of [Section] 2 it is NOT the purpose of the words to evoke images. (It may of course be discovered that that helps to attain the actual purpose.)" First off, it's important to approach EVERY esteemed philosopher with some respect (in particular, don't "understand him too quickly"), but not with reverence. Wittgenstein was immensely useful in the advancement of certain areas of philosophy. But his thinking could frequently be profoundly fuzzy, and filled with gaps. For example, he does not seem aware here that in abruptly using the word 'purpose' he could be stirring all sorts of very different notion in the minds of his readers. (I could also argue that Section 2 does indeed hinge on the efficacy of the words in summoning up a "picture". If the builder cries "Slab!" to his assistant, he does not want the assistant to bring him a pillar; the builder is counting on his utterance to occasion in his assistant's mind the image of a slab). More fundamental is his use of the verb 'to mean' and 'meaning', and even "to use". His major conclusion in P.I. seems to me fatally faulty i.e. that "a word's meaning is its use in the community". I'm vexed by having limited time, which I'd rather devote to pursuing what I'd judge to be "right" theories than exposing wrong ones in detail.
