Cheerskep, I am not sure I understand your criticism of Wittgenstein . From what I can surmise from the passage you quoted (i do not have the Investigations at hand), he is arguing precisely against the kind of position you hold. And were I to translate the passage you kindly provided, I would render 'Zweck' more informally as 'Goal' or maybe 'aim' in this context, so as to bring out the pragmatic implications that Wittgenstein is alluding to. Hence, my translation would be:
One can say that this ostensive teaching of words creates an associative > connection between word and thing. But what is that? Well, it may mean > different things, but one can certainly conceive that an image of the thing > passes before the mind's eye of the child, when the child hears the right > word. But if that now occurs, is that the GOAL of the word? Of course it > CAN be, and I can imagine such a use of words (series of sounds). (the > utterance of a word would be similar to a note played on the piano of our > imagination). But, in section 2, the aim of language is not to stir the > images associated with words (to be sure, though, it might also turn out > that this association is conducive to the actual aim) > The differences in translation are minor. Wittgensteins remarks, however, do seem to offer a fair characterization of your position, and a criticism of it. What exactly do you thin is wrong here? What does he say that misses your point? On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 5:53 PM, Tom McCormack <[email protected]> wrote: > There's an argument that to get a surer grasp on what Wittgenstein had in > mind > with 'heisst' in "Aber was heisst das?", it would be helpful to see how he > uses it throughout PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS especially on the page > where > "Aber was heisst das?" appears. Presumably, P.I.'s translators, Anscombe > and > Rhees, did that, and by the time they'd finished the second edition they > evidently thought they had it right (or as "right" as a translation can > ever > be). > > > > Here (I hope) is the German, beginning with the sentence immediately before > (without umlauts, and with caps for L.W.'s italics.): > > > > "Dieses hinweisende Lehren der Worter , kann man sagen, schlagt eine > assoziative Verbindung zwischen dem Vort und dem Ding. Aber was heisst das? > Nun, es kann Verschiedenes heissen; aber man denkt wohl zunachst daran, > dass > dem Kind das Bild des Dings vor die Seele tritt, wenn es das Vort hort. > Aber > wenn das nun geschieht,-- ist das der Zweck des Worts? Ja, es KANN der > Zweck > sein. Ich kann mir eine solche Verwendung von Wortern (Lautreihen) denken. > (Das Aussprechen eines Wortes ist gleichsam ein Anschlagen einer Taste auf > dem > Vorstellungklavier. Aber in der Sprache im [Section] 2 ist es NICHT der > Zweck > der Worter, Vorstellungen zu erwecken. (Es kann freilich auch gefunden > werden, dass dies dem eigentlichen Zweck forderlich ist.)" > > > > Anscombe and Rhees: "This ostensive teaching of words can be said to > establish > an association between the word and the thing. But what does this mean? > Well, > it can mean various things; but one very likely thinks first of all that a > picture of the object comes before the child's mind when it hears the word. > But now, if this does happen is that the purpose of the word? Yes, it > CAN > be the purpose I can imagine such a use of words (of series of sounds). > (Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the > imagination.) > But in the language of [Section] 2 it is NOT the purpose of the words to > evoke > images. (It may of course be discovered that that helps to attain the > actual > purpose.)" > > > > First off, it's important to approach EVERY esteemed philosopher with some > respect (in particular, don't "understand him too quickly"), but not with > reverence. Wittgenstein was immensely useful in the advancement of certain > areas of philosophy. But his thinking could frequently be profoundly fuzzy, > and filled with gaps. > > > > For example, he does not seem aware here that in abruptly using the word > 'purpose' he could be stirring all sorts of very different notion in the > minds > of his readers. (I could also argue that Section 2 does indeed hinge on the > efficacy of the words in summoning up a "picture". If the builder cries > "Slab!" to his assistant, he does not want the assistant to bring him a > pillar; the builder is counting on his utterance to occasion in his > assistant's mind the image of a slab). > > > > More fundamental is his use of the verb 'to mean' and 'meaning', and even > "to > use". His major conclusion in P.I. seems to me fatally faulty i.e. that > "a > word's meaning is its use in the community". I'm vexed by having limited > time, > which I'd rather devote to pursuing what I'd judge to be "right" theories > than > exposing wrong ones in detail.
