OK, I want to slink away from Michael while whispering if all A is B then all
of 

whatever A consists of is identical to B, even as I need to recognize
that all A 

could be IN B, which is what Michael is asserting, I think.  It's
a matter of 
choice, predicated by some unmentioned limiting context.  This
takes us to 
people like Derrida and his idea that no matter how explicit we
try to be, 
something gets away, something is left unexplained, or left over.
Now, on to 
morality:  If nature is 'indifferent in moral terms' (assuming we
can say that ) 

then how does it survive?  If nature was purely amoral in its
processes, then 
why do people deal with morality?  One of the possible
conditions of total 
amorality would be total annihilation, I presume, whereas
moral acts are 
fundamentally intended to avoid that.  If nature is and always
was amoral, it 
wouldn't be, or would it?  Either morality is necessary or it
isn't. 
wc


----- Original Message ----
From: Michael Brady
<[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Thu,
August 2, 2012 5:35:58 PM
Subject: Re: bMy task is, above all, to make you
see.b

William wrote:

> I'm inclined to let Michael's argument below pass,
but only because I'm
exhausted these days by all my activities and
responsibilities.  Yet...yet...I
don't think Michael can slide by the issue as
adroitly as he seems to do.
Terms like Unity, Truth, Beauty are among the most
elastic terms every
invented. They are also so inclusive as to defy any
presumed exceptions. What
part of Unity is not Truth? What part of Truth is
not Beauty?  Using the
analogy to photography, Michael claims that that three
shutter functions rely
on each other but are not each other. But, again, what
part of each is not the
other? If there are such parts of each term what
disqualifies them from being
necessary to both other terms?

I first said that
these each of these properties or qualities is a
manifestation of the others
(sort of like avatars of Vishnu--oops, an
analogy!).

William said that if all
A (Unity) = B (Truth) and all B = C (Beautiful), then
all A = C.

That may
well be true, but he also said that this A = B = C is circular. That
is not
so. His A = B = C scheme attempted to make an identity of them, but
that
doesn't mean that the definining qualities of A are the same defining
qualities of B or C. That was what I said in rebuttal. Merely to assert that
Beauty, Truth, Unity, and Goodness are elastic terms is insufficient and in
fact beside the point. (Cheerskep continually returns to his thesis of fuzzy
ideas and imprecise statements, which allows enough room for elastic
denotations.)

But this small dispute is a mere adjunct to Berg's question,
"Did Conrad mean
that an
artist's creation should provide a clearer view of
reality?" This is a
question about right action ("should provide"). I was
answering that question
when I introduced the Scholastics' theory (O-G-T-B).
My "Art moralizes Nature; Nature demoralizes art" encapsulates my belief that
the rules of art (as of other disciplines) codify a set of preferred or
endorsed or valued uses, which can be called moral to the extent that they
prescribe behavior. Nature is oblivious to these rules and reveals itself in
every imaginable way, rules be damned. That's how I came to bring O-G-T-B into
the discussion.


| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Michael Brady

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