On Sunday 07 September 2003 18:38, Ben Goertzel wrote:
Hi Ben,
> > Qualia by their definition (ineffable, non-causal etc.) have no
> > function, can
> > have no function in the system, that I do agree with Dennett ('quining
> > qualia'). I also agree with Dennett that if the behaviour of a system is
> > completely explained nothing remains, all extra ontology is just
> > redundant
> > metaphysics. Eliminate it by Ockham's razor; like William James
> > said: 'every
> > difference must make a difference.'
>
> Hmmmm.... One modification to this: Even if all the behavior of a system
> is completely explained by ideas in set X, there may still be a value for
> ideas in set Y if they give a *simpler* explanation of the behavior of a
> system.
Yes, of course (in which case X must be eliminated according to Ockham's
razor).
>
> This is not just a quibble, it's a relevant issue. Even if mechanisms give
> a complete explanation of a system's behavior, qualia could still be
> relevant if they give a simpler explanation of aspects of the system's
> behavior. Which *does* appear to be the case...
First of all, the qualia the way they are defined as 'raw ineffable non-causal
experiential qualities' are not capable of playing any causal rol (Dennett's
'quining qualia'). 'But they are there, can't you see?' The existence of
qualia need not be inferred, the evidence is direct. That is what makes
qualia so impossible to handle, and what makes Dennett to protest against
them. Because when all of the brain's functioning were completely explained
to the last detail, according to the believers in qualia something is still
left out. (Of course there are people like Searle who think that this total
explanation of the brain's functioning is impossible without qualia. Owen
Flanagan protests again the ineffability non-causal definition of qualia (but
then we get a sort of mind-body interactionistic dualism, not?))
The second, related, point is that in mentalistic terms (believes, desires...)
one can get a very simple effective model of a person (an intentional
system), but that model is never complete (for complete explanation). A
physicalistic model of a person would be (I extrapolate the successes of
neurocognitive science). Ockham's rule says to be parsimonous, but it is only
applicable in the case of equal explanatory power of theories.
But maybe you define qualia differently????
Bye,
Arnoud
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