On Monday 08 September 2003 14:37, Ben Goertzel wrote:
> > The problem is to
> > fit qualia
> > into a pure physicalistic ontology. Physical theories because of their
> > success have become the measure of all things.
>
> I understand your perspective, but mine is different. I'm not so sure that
> physical theories are the measure of all things. Physicalistic
> reductionism is just one among many useful views of the world. Perhaps
> where qualia are concerned, it's not the most important or useful view?
But isn't interactionistic mind-body dualism the alternative? Or do you have
some subtle pluralistic ontology in mind (like Putnam's or so).
I think that physicalism is very much justified. Since quantum mechanics
chemistry is reduced to physics. (Cel)Biology is mostly chemistry. Psychology
and sociology are starting to be reduced to biology (neuroscience and
sociobiology). All there is is matter in motion, and physics describes that;
so there's only one conclusion, not?
Physicalism does not entail that we have to talk in a pure physicalistic
vocabulary like e.g. Quine liked to have it. Some pragmatic tolerance towards
practical but ultimately unreal entities and corresponding vocabulary is also
possible. See for example the 'mild' realism of Dennett on intentional
entities like desires and believes, the supervenience model of Davidson.
>
> > The problem will not be/is not, in any case, whether qualia terms
> > like 'red'
> > and 'soft' need to be eliminated or not outof all talk, and be treated
> > differently in the rough and tumble of daily life, with distrust, like
> > putting 'darkness(' and ')' around it. Like many of the concepts and
> > heuristics ('folk physics' 'folk psychology') we use in daily
> > life we could
> > be anti-realists about them, just instrumentalists. They are
> > simply useful,
> > but also lead to errors and are incomplete.
>
> Agree, they're useful, erroneous and incomplete -- and there may be no
> other useful tools for describing experiences that are less erroneous and
> incomplete, without being immensely more complicated
Quite probable. A neurocognitive model/simulation of a certain person's brain
that will enable to predict that person's behaviour, as the alternative for
the intentional stance, will probably be that.
>
> I tend to take a Peircean pragmatist philosophy, in which "instrumentality"
> is the crux of truth...
Yes, I like Peirce's ideas too. Pragmatism is one of my favorite philosophical
currents. For mundane propositions of daily life like 'I have a potato in my
shopping bag' truth is well measured by instrumentality, by 'What works'. But
for the more scientific truths I think (predictive) infallibility and
completeness (wide range of phenomena) to the highest possible degree is also
needed.
Arnoud
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