On 6/5/07, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I do think its a misuse of "agency" to ascribe moral agency to what is > effectively only a tool. Even a human, operating under duress, i.e. > as a tool for another, should be considered as having diminished or no > moral agency, in my opinion. So, effectively, it sounds like agency requires both consciousness and willful control (and this debate actually has nothing to do with "moral" at all). I can agree with that.
Funny, I thought there was nothing of significance between our positions; now it seems clear that there is. I would not claim that agency requires consciousness; it is necessary only that an agent acts on its environment so as to minimize the difference between the external environment and its internal model of the preferred environment The perception of agency inheres in an observer, which might or might not include the agent itself. An ant (while presumably lacking self-awareness) can be seen as its own agent (promoting its own internal values) as well as being an agent of the colony. A person is almost always their own agent to some extent, and commonly seen as acting as an agent of others. A newborn baby is seen as an agent of itself, reaching for the nipple, even while it yet lacks the self-awareness to recognize its own agency. A simple robot, autonomous but lacking self-awareness is an agent promoting the values expressed by its design, and possibly also an agent of its designer to the extent that the designer's preferences are reflected in the robot's preferences. Moral agency, however, requires both agency and self-awareness. Moral agency is not about the acting but the deciding, and is necessarily over a context that includes the values of at least one other agent. This requirement of expanded decision-making context is what makes the difference between what is seen as merely "good" (to an individual) and what is seen as "right" or "moral" (to a group.) Morality is a function of a group, not of an individual. The difference entails **agreement**, thus decision-making context greater than a single agent, thus recognition of self in order to recognize the existence of the greater context including both self and other agency. Now we are back to the starting point, where I saw your statement about the possibility of moral agency sans consciousness as a provocative one. Can you see why? - Jef ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=231415&user_secret=e9e40a7e