Mark Waser wrote:
...
= = = = = = = = = =
"Play the game" by *assuming* that you are a Friendly and asking
yourself what you would do to protect yourself without breaking your
declaration of Friendliness. It's fun and addictive and hopefully
will lead you to declaring Friendliness yourself.
(Yes, I really *am* serious about spreading Friendliness. It's my own
little, but hopefully growing, cult and I'm sticking to it.)
I think that you need to look into the simulations that have been run
involving Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. Friendly covers many
strategies, including (I think) Dove and Retaliator. Retaliator is
almost an ESS, and becomes one if the rest of the population is either
Hawk or Dove. In a population of Doves, Probers have a high success
rate, better than either Hawks or Doves. If the population is largely
Doves with an admixture of Hawks, Retaliators do well. Etc. (Note that
each of these Strategies is successful depending on a model with certain
costs of success an other costs for failure specific to the strategy.)
Attempts to find a pure strategy that is uniformly successful have so
far failed. Mixed strategies, however, can be quite successful, and
different environments yield different values for the optimal mix. (The
model that you are proposing looks almost like Retaliator, and that's a
pretty good Strategy, but can be shown to be suboptimal against a
variety of different mixed strategies. Often even against
Prober-Retaliator, if the environment contains sufficient Doves, though
it's inferior if most of the population is simple Retaliators.)
-------------------------------------------
agi
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