On 24/03/2008, Jim Bromer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > To try to understand what I am talking about, start by imagining a > simulation of some physical operation, like a part of a complex factory in a > Sim City kind of game. In this kind of high-level model no one would ever > imagine all of the objects should interact in one stereotypical way, > different objects would interact with other objects in different kinds of > ways. And no one would imagine that the machines that operated on other > objects in the simulation were not also objects in their own right. For > instance the machines used in production might require the use of other > machines to fix or enhance them. And the machines might produce or > operate on objects that were themselves machines. When you think about a > simulation of some complicated physical systems it becomes very obvious that > different kinds of objects can have different effects on other objects. And > yet, when it comes to AI, people go on an on about systems that totally > disregard this seemingly obvious divergence of effect that is so typical of > nature. Instead most theories see insight as if it could be funneled > through some narrow rational system or other less rational field operations > where the objects of the operations are only seen as the ineffective object > of the pre-defined operations of the program. >
How would this differ from the sorts of computational systems I have been muttering about? Where you have an architecture where an active bit of code or program is equivalent to an object in the above paragraph. Also have a look at Eurisko by Doug Lenat. Will Pearson ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=98558129-0bdb63 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
