MW: I see all your references are reinforcing the need for grounding and
some
showing how grounding *can* be accomplished by images (among many other
methods :-), but I have yet to find any of your references clearly saying
all meanings must be grounded BY IMAGES. That was the basis for my last
request to you.
To clarify any possible confusion here. I - and the scientists concerned -
absolutely do not mean grounding as in pointing to things. I and they are
talking about various formsof imaginative simulation, which are usually
unconscious. There is a definite problem here re common terminology -
"amodal/modal, imaginative, sensorimotor simulation; simulation semantics;
embodied ; mirroring " etc. Only Barsalou, I think, makes much use of
"grounding." But they are all talking about the same set of simulation
processes underpinning our general information processing, including NLP.
You and others, if you are at all serious, really must read:
http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Barsalou_ARP_2008_grounded_cognition.pdf
and pos:
http://psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Barsalou_LCP_2003_situated_simulation.pdf
If you don't find it interesting, you can come back & shout at me - & you
know how good that makes you feel. & if clicking is too strenuous for you,
here's the short opening section re:
"WHAT IS GROUNDED
COGNITION?
Standard theories of cognition assume that
knowledge resides in a semantic memory system
separate from the brain's modal systems
for perception (e.g., vision, audition),
action (e.g., movement, proprioception), and
introspection (e.g., mental states, affect). According
to standard theories, representations
in modal systems are transduced into
amodal symbols that represent knowledge
about experience in semantic memory. Once
this knowledge exists, it supports the spectrum
of cognitive processes from perception
to thought.
Conceptions of grounded cognition take
many different forms (Gibbs 2006, Wilson
2002). In general, however, they reject the
standard view that amodal symbols represent
knowledge in semantic memory. From the
perspective of grounded cognition, it is unlikely
that the brain contains amodal symbols;
if it does, they work together with modal representations
to create cognition.
Some accounts of grounded cognition focus
on roles of the body in cognition, based
on widespread findings that bodily states
can cause cognitive states and be effects
of them (e.g., Barsalou et al. 2003, Lakoff
& Johnson 1980, Smith 2005b). Most accounts
of grounded cognition, however, focus
on the roles of simulation in cognition
(e.g., Barsalou 1999, Decety & Gr`ezes 2006,
Goldman 2006). Simulation is the reenactment
of perceptual, motor, and introspective
states acquired during experience with the
world, body, and mind. As an experience occurs
(e.g., easing into a chair), the brain captures
states across the modalities and integrates
them with a multimodal representation
stored in memory (e.g., how a chair looks and
feels, the action of sitting, introspections of
comfort and relaxation). Later, when knowledge
is needed to represent a category (e.g.,
chair), multimodal representations....
-------------------------------------------
agi
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