Matt, Matt,
Although different people (or even the same people at different times) define consciousness differently, there as a considerable degree of overlap. I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. (This would include much of what Richard was discussing in his paper.) Much of scientific discovery searches for things of which it has only partial descriptions, often ones much less complete than that which I have just given. But others on this list might have meaningful additions to the definition of what it is that we should be looking for when we search to understand consciousness. Ed Porter -----Original Message----- From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 5:39 PM To: [email protected] Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction Before you can start searching for consciousness, you need to describe precisely what you are looking for. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Ed Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction > To: [email protected] > Date: Monday, November 17, 2008, 5:15 PM > Matt, > > With regard to your first point I largely agree with you. > I would, however, > qualify it with the fact that many of us find it hard not > to sympathize with > people or animals, such as a dog, under certain > circumstances when we > directly sense outward manifestations that they are > experiencing terrible > pain, unless we have a sufficient hatred toward them to > compensate for our > natural tendency to feel sympathy for them. Some people > attribute this to > mirror neurons, and the fact that we evolved to be tribal > social animals. > > With regard to the second point, your statement does not > refute my point, > although my point is admittedly based on belief that is far > from certain. > Our understanding of the physical (such as neural) > correlates of conscious > is currently sufficiently limited that it does not yet let > us say much about > the consciousness or lack thereof of the systems you > describe, even if one > assumes they are totally understood in terms of things > other than the > knowledge of the physical correlates of consciousness that > we currently > don't have, but will have within fifty years. > > But from what little we do understand about the neural > correlates of > consciousness, it does not seem that either system you > describe would have > anything approaching a human consciousness, and thus a > human experience of > pain, since they lack the type of computation normally > associated with > reports by humans of conscious experience. > > Ed Porter > > -----Original Message----- > From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 4:45 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the > problem of > consciousness--correction > > --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > >First, it is not clear "people > >are free to decide what makes pain > "real"," at least > >subjectively real. > > I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. > For example, a > scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when > it is stuck in the > eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even > though it squirms > just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify > one's ethics to > feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and > Nazi war crime > trials. > > >If we have anything close to the advances in brain > scanning and brain > science > >that Kurzweil predicts 1, we should come to understand > the correlates of > >consciousness quite well > > No. I used examples like autobliss ( > http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt ) and the > roundworm c. elegans as > examples of simple systems whose functions are completely > understood, yet > the question of whether such systems experience pain > remains a philosophical > question that cannot be answered by experiment. > > -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > ------------------------------------------- > agi > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: > https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > > > > ------------------------------------------- > agi > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: > https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
