I started to get into this, but deleted it because it seemed like too much of
an aside.
My feeling is that No faking regulates the "posting of ineffective actions
with intent to mislead".
So "sending the message 'I object' in a context that I know will fail in a
misleading way" is a regulated action, but the general case of sending
"I object" in a non-misleading context is not. (for example, my recent
"I object to everything" was found to be not-misleading, therefore
unregulated).
This of course brings up the problem with prosecuting No Faking in general
(figuring out intent) but that's an issue anyway.
On Fri, 2 Nov 2018, D. Margaux wrote:
> Re CFJ 3680—
>
> I don’t disagree with the conclusion. I think you’re right that the plain
> language meanings could go either way, and I have no problem with the plain
> language being interpreted in the parliamentary sense so that only one
> objection counts as an objection.
>
> The rest of the reasoning is a bit hard for me to follow, though.
>
> I take you to be saying that, even if doing X is regulated, the act of
> *posting* the message “I do X” is often (maybe usually or always?)
> unregulated. In this example, I think you’re suggesting that it is
> unregulated to perform the sequence of steps that results in “posting an
> objection” (i.e., sending to a public forum the text, “I object”).
>
> But I think that’s not right. No Faking, for example, regulates the *posting*
> of the objection, because it is illegal to post a message that says “I
> object” if you know it is INEFFECTIVE (e.g., if you already withdrew an
> objection).
>
> Not sure where that leaves us. Maybe I am just confused.
