On Thu, 2 May 2019, Michel Py wrote:

I think that some of the participants in this thread have little idea of what 
could happen if we open Pandora's box.

Let's start with an easy one : what do we do with ARIN members who hijack DoD 
space ?
It is no secret that 30.0.0.0/8 has become RFC1918 bis.
They don't announce it, but they use it. I shows up in traceroutes.
https://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html#.XMsp8DBKhdg

That's really news to me.

As long as you don't announce it to other networks i don't see an issue.

As long as nobody complains, i don't see an issue.


If we set-up ARIN to be the cop of the Internet, what happens if a general in the Pentagon decides that people should not be using address space that has been allocated do DoD at all, and decides that ARIN is responsible for fixing it ? Perfectly good military strategy, it's called a proxy war.

Or simply trying to defend the legitimate exclusive rights of usage?


What if the DoD has that interpretation of what "hijacking" means ? Could be argued that these addresses are unique and should not be used at all.

OK, so it's OK that someone announces slices from 50/8, 60/8, 70/8 towards other networks......?



If we go down the road that some are suggesting, some people are going to feel that they have been selectively targeted, then other people are going to feel that ARIN has not taken action when needed, the list of potential grievances is endless.

I think what the proposal contains is the ability so anyone who feels a victim from an hijacking event can file a report. The proposal also proposes any finding come from the community, not from the RIR.



My view is that ARIN is a registry, not a law enforcement agency and I think it should stay that way.

Nobody is trying to create that department :-)
ARIN is a registry with 1/5 of the global responsibility.
Which law enforcement agencies are able to act against hijacks/hijackers?
ARIN at least has the ability to do something, given proper independent, multiple-viewpoint advice.


Regards,
Carlos



Michel.

_______________________________________________
ARIN-PPML
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to
the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List ([email protected]).
Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at:
https://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml
Please contact [email protected] if you experience any issues.

_______________________________________________
ARIN-PPML
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to
the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List ([email protected]).
Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at:
https://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml
Please contact [email protected] if you experience any issues.

Reply via email to