| The draft itself is much needed (I was skeptical of QR codes, this draft confirms that). The example was greatly improved!
Deb Hi *Deb and Authors,
*Deb - As AD, please review the changes to Section 4.3.8. and let us know if they are approved.
These changes are viewable in the diff: https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc10027-auth48rfcdiff.html.
Authors - Thank you for your reply. We have updated the files accordingly.
Upon careful review, please contact us with any further updates or with your approval of the document in its current form.
We will await approvals from each party listed on the Final Review status page for this document prior to moving forward in the publication process.
The Final Review status of your document is available here:
https://queue.rfc-editor.org/final-review/rfc10027
— FILES (please refresh): —
The updated files have been posted here:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc10027.txt
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc10027.pdf
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc10027.html
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc10027.xml
Diff files showing changes made during Final Review:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc10027-auth48diff.html
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc10027-auth48rfcdiff.html (side by side)
Diff files showing all changes:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc10027-diff.html
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc10027-rfcdiff.html (side by side)
All the best,
Kaelin Foody
RFC Production Center
> On Aug 4, 2026, at 8:29 AM, Filip Skokan <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Dear RFC Editor(s),
>
> Thank you for the careful review. Our consolidated responses follow. Textual changes use the requested OLD/NEW format.
>
> 1) The new BCP assignment is correct.
>
> 2) Global (document title)
>
> OLD:
> Cross-Device Flows: Security Best Current Practice
>
> NEW:
> Best Current Practice for Security of Cross-Device Flows
>
>
> 3) Section 1.2
>
> OLD:
> This flow may be streamlined by rendering the session transfer code as a QR code on the Authorization Device and scanned by the Consumption Device.
>
> NEW:
> This flow may be streamlined by rendering the session transfer code as a QR code on the Authorization Device and scanning it with the Consumption Device.
>
>
> 4) Section 1.2
>
> OLD:
> These flows are often used to add new devices to a network, onboard customers to a mobile application, or provision new credentials (e.g., [OpenID.SIOPV2]).
>
> NEW:
> These flows are often used to add new devices to a network, onboard customers to a mobile application, or provision new credentials (e.g., as described in [OpenID.SIOPV2]).
>
>
> 5) Section 1.4
>
> OLD:
> This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token", "authorization server", "resource server", "authorization endpoint", "authorization request", and "client" defined in "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749].
>
> NEW:
> This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token", "authorization server", "resource server", "authorization request", and "client" defined in "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749].
>
>
> 6) Section 2
>
> OLD:
> Section 3 provides details about susceptible protocols, and Section 4 provides attack descriptions. Section 6.1 provides details about the security mechanisms and mitigations, Section 6.2 provides protocol selection guidance, and Section 6.3 provides details from formal analysis of protocols that apply to cross-device flows.
>
> NEW:
> Section 3 provides details about susceptible protocols, and Section 4 provides attack descriptions. Section 5 provides an overview of existing protocols and standards. Section 6.1 provides details about the security mechanisms and mitigations, Section 6.2 provides protocol selection guidance, and Section 6.3 provides details from formal analysis of protocols that apply to cross-device flows.
>
>
> 7) Section 3.3.8 (heading)
>
> OLD:
> Example A8: Access a Productivity Application
>
> NEW:
> Example A8: Access a Productivity Application (User-Transferred Authorization Data Pattern)
>
>
> Section 4.3.8
>
> OLD:
> Example B8: Account Takeover (User-Transferred Session Data Pattern)
>
> This exploit applies to the use case described in Section 3.3.8.
>
> An attacker wants to use some website that requires presentation of a verifiable credential for authentication. The attacker creates a phishing website, which will in real time capture login QR codes from the original website and present these to the user. The attacker tries to get the user to use the phishing website by sending messages by email or other messaging technologies. The user scans the QR code on the phishing website, invokes their digital wallet, and presents their credentials. Once the credentials are presented, the original session from the attacker's device is authorized with the user's credentials.
>
> NEW:
> Example B8: Account Takeover (User-Transferred Authorization Data Pattern)
>
> This exploit applies to the use case described in Section 3.3.8.
>
> An attacker obtains a user's credentials for a Computer-Aided Design (CAD) application but cannot complete the authorization without the 6-digit authorization code sent to the user's mobile phone. The attacker triggers the authorization request, causing the Authorization Server to send a 6-digit authorization code to the user's mobile phone. The attacker then contacts the user, claiming to be from the CAD application's support desk and investigating a problem with the user's account, and asks the user to read back the code they have just received. Because the attacker has established the context for the code, the user provides it. The attacker enters the code in the CAD application and obtains access to the user's designs.
>
>
> 8) This change is superseded by the replacement text for Section 4.3.8 in response 7.
>
>
> 9) Section 5
>
> OLD:
> An authorization server MAY use techniques such as device fingerprinting, network address, or other techniques to detect if a cross-device protocol is being used on the same device.
>
> NEW:
> An Authorization Server MAY use device fingerprinting, network address, or other techniques to detect if a cross-device protocol is being used on the same device.
>
>
> 10) Section 6.1.1
>
> OLD:
> The paragraph beginning "Note: There are scenarios that require that authorization takes place..." is a normal paragraph.
>
> NEW:
> Place this paragraph in an <aside> element.
>
>
> 11) Section 6.1.5
>
> OLD:
> Some scenarios may require legitimate retransmission of user, QR, and authorization data (e.g., retries).
>
> NEW:
> Some scenarios may require legitimate retransmission of user data, QR codes, and authorization data (e.g., retries).
>
>
> 12) Section 6.1.8
>
> OLD:
> In some deployments, a trusted network may also be inferred using SIM or network operator supplied information.
>
> NEW:
> In some deployments, a trusted network may also be inferred using information supplied by a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) or the network operator.
>
>
> 13) Section 6.1.8
>
> OLD:
> Even if it is possible to deploy network-level controls, it SHOULD be used in conjunction with other controls outlined in this document to achieve defense in depth.
>
> NEW:
> Even if it is possible to deploy network-level controls, they SHOULD be used in conjunction with other controls outlined in this document to achieve defense in depth.
>
>
> Section 6.1.11
>
> OLD:
> Therefore, it should be used along with other techniques to provide a defense-in-depth defense against cross-device attacks.
>
> NEW:
> Therefore, they should be used along with other techniques to provide defense in depth against cross-device attacks.
>
>
> 14) Section 6.2.1.4
>
> OLD:
> In addition to the security considerations section in the standard, it is RECOMMENDED that one or more of the mitigations outlined in this document be considered, especially mitigations that can help establish proximity or prevent attackers from obtaining QR or user codes.
>
> NEW:
> In addition to the Security Considerations section in [RFC8628], it is RECOMMENDED that one or more of the mitigations outlined in this document be considered, especially mitigations that can help establish proximity or prevent attackers from obtaining QR or user codes.
>
>
> Section 6.2.2.4
>
> OLD:
> In addition to the security considerations section in the standard, it is RECOMMENDED that one or more of the mitigations outlined in this document be considered, especially mitigations that can help establish proximity or prevent attackers from initiating authorization requests.
>
> NEW:
> In addition to the Security Considerations section in [CIBA], it is RECOMMENDED that one or more of the mitigations outlined in this document be considered, especially mitigations that can help establish proximity or prevent attackers from initiating authorization requests.
>
>
> 15) Section 6.2.2.2
>
> OLD:
> Less susceptible to unauthenticated channel attacks, but still vulnerable to attackers who know or can guess the user identifier and initiate an attack as described in Section 4.3.4.1.
>
> NEW:
> CIBA is less susceptible to unauthenticated channel attacks, but it is still vulnerable to attackers who know or can guess the user identifier and initiate an attack as described in Section 4.3.4.1.
>
>
> 16) Section 6.2.3.2
>
> OLD:
> The CDA flow proves proximity by leveraging BLE advertisements for service establishment, significantly reducing the susceptibility to any of the exploits described in examples 1-6.
>
> NEW:
> The CDA flow proves proximity by leveraging BLE advertisements for service establishment, significantly reducing the susceptibility to any of the exploits described in examples B1-B6 in Section 4.3.
>
>
> 17) References
>
> a) Please alphabetize the references.
>
> b) The updates to [W3CWebAuthn], [OpenID.VP], [OpenID.Core], and [W3C.DCAPI] look correct.
>
> c) The update to [NEWDCPHISH] looks correct.
>
> d) The update to [DCATTACK] looks correct.
>
>
> 18) Global terminology
>
> OLD:
> Mixed use of "Authorization Server" and "authorization server".
>
> NEW:
> Use "Authorization Server" consistently.
>
>
> OLD:
> Mixed use of "sender-constrained tokens" and "sender-constraining tokens".
>
> NEW:
> Use "sender-constrained tokens" consistently.
>
>
> OLD:
> Mixed forms of "defense in depth".
>
> NEW:
> Use "defense in depth" as a noun phrase and "defense-in-depth" when used attributively. No definition in Section 1.4 is needed.
>
>
> OLD:
> Pattern names use inconsistent capitalization.
>
> NEW:
> Capitalize pattern names consistently, including:
> User-Transferred Session Data Pattern
> Backchannel-Transferred Session Pattern
> User-Transferred Authorization Data Pattern
> Cross-Device Session Transfer Pattern
>
>
> OLD:
> Device Authorization Grant
> Authorization Code Grant
> Authorization Code Flow
>
> NEW:
> device authorization grant
> authorization code grant
> authorization code flow
>
> No changes are required to the different forms of "user code" and "QR code" listed in question 18(d).
>
>
> 19) Abbreviations
>
> a) "Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)" is correct.
>
> b) Section 6.1.7
>
> OLD:
> Trusted devices MAY have their identities rooted in hardware (e.g., a TPM or equivalent technology).
>
> NEW:
> Trusted devices MAY have their identities rooted in hardware (e.g., a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or equivalent technology).
>
>
> SIM is expanded in the response to question 12.
>
> FAPI has no current official expansion. Please refer to it as "OpenID FAPI". If a link is useful, the working group page is https://openid.net/wg/fapi/.
>
> SATMC is the name of the tool and should remain unexpanded.
>
> c) Global
>
> OLD:
> Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication is expanded repeatedly.
>
> NEW:
> Expand the first occurrence as "Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA)" and use "CIBA" thereafter.
>
>
> 20) Global
>
> The terms "native client" and "native apps" should remain unchanged.
>
> OLD:
> traditional phishing attacks
>
> NEW:
> conventional phishing attacks
>
>
> Thank you,
> Pieter, Daniel, and Filip
>
> On Fri, 31 Jul 2026 at 06:42, <[email protected]> wrote:
> Authors,
>
> While reviewing this document during Final Review, please resolve (as necessary) the following questions, which are also in the source file.
>
> 1) <!--[rfced] This document has been assigned a new BCP number. Please let us
> know if this is not correct (i.e., it should be part of an existing BCP).
>
> See the complete list of BCPs here:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcps
> -->
>
>
> 2) <!-- [rfced] May we update the document title as follows to align with other RFC
> titles that include "Best Current Practice"?
>
> Original:
> Cross-Device Flows: Security Best Current Practice
>
> Perhaps:
> Best Current Practice for Security of Cross-Device Flows
> -->
>
>
> 3) <!-- [rfced] In the text below, how may we clarify "and scanned by"?
>
> Original:
> This flow may be streamlined by rendering the
> session transfer code as a QR code on the Authorization Device and
> scanned by the Consumption Device.
>
> Perhaps A:
> This flow may be streamlined by rendering the
> session transfer code as a QR code on the Authorization Device and
> scanning it with the Consumption Device.
>
> Perhaps B:
> This flow may be streamlined by rendering the
> session transfer code as a QR code on the Authorization Device that is
> scanned by the Consumption Device.
> -->
>
>
> 4) <!-- [rfced] How may we clarify "(e.g., [OpenID.SIOPV2])" here? Is the intent
> "(e.g., as described in [OpenID.SIOPV2])"?
>
> Original:
> These flows are
> often used to add new devices to a network, onboard customers to a
> mobile application, or provision new credentials (e.g.,
> [OpenID.SIOPV2]).
>
> Perhaps:
> These flows are
> often used to add new devices to a network, onboard customers to a
> mobile application, or provision new credentials (e.g., as described in
> [OpenID.SIOPV2]).
> -->
>
>
> 5) <!-- [rfced] The term "authorization endpoint" is listed in Section 1.4 but is
> not used elsewhere in the document. Should it be removed from Section 1.4?
> -->
>
>
> 6) <!-- [rfced] Should Section 5 be mentioned in this paragraph? If so, please
> provide the text.
>
> Current:
> Section 3 provides details about susceptible protocols, and Section 4
> provides attack descriptions. Section 6.1 provides details about the
> security mechanisms and mitigations, Section 6.2 provides protocol
> selection guidance, and Section 6.3 provides details from formal
> analysis of protocols that apply to cross-device flows.
> -->
>
>
> 7) <!-- [rfced] We note empty parentheses in the section title below. We have
> removed them, but please review and let us know if you would like to add any
> text to them. We see that other subsections of Section 3.3 have parentheses that
> indicate the applicable pattern.
>
> Original:
>
> 3.3.8. Example A8: Access a Productivity Application ()
> -->
>
>
> 8) <!-- [rfced] May we move "in real time" as shown below to improve the flow of
> this sentence?
>
> Original:
> The attacker creates a
> phishing website which will in real time capture log-in QR Codes from
> the original website and present these to the user.
>
> Perhaps:
> The attacker creates a
> phishing website, which will capture login QR codes from
> the original website and present them to the user in real time.
> -->
>
>
> 9) <!-- [rfced] May we update this sentence to avoid using "techniques" twice?
>
> Original:
> An authorization server MAY use techniques such as device
> fingerprinting, network address or other techniques to detect if a
> cross-device protocol is being used on the same device.
>
> Perhaps:
> An authorization server MAY use device
> fingerprinting, network address, or other techniques to detect if a
> cross-device protocol is being used on the same device.
> -->
>
>
> 10) <!-- [rfced] Please review whether the note in Section 6.1.1 (i.e., the text
> prefaced with "Note:") should be in the <aside> element. It is defined as "a
> container for content that is semantically less important or tangential to the
> content that surrounds it" (https://authors.ietf.org/en/rfcxml-vocabulary#aside).
> -->
>
>
> 11) <!-- [rfced] Should "of user, QR and authorization data" be updated as follows?
>
> Original:
> Some scenarios may require legitimate re-transmission
> of user, QR and authorization data (e.g., retries).
>
> Perhaps:
> Some scenarios may require legitimate retransmission
> of user codes, QR codes, and authorization data (e.g., retries).
> -->
>
>
> 12) <!-- [rfced] Is the information supplied by the network operator (Perhaps
> A) or by SIM or the network operator (Perhaps B)?
>
> Original:
> In some deployments a trusted network may also
> be inferred using SIM or network operator supplied information.
>
> Perhaps A:
> In some deployments, a trusted network may also
> be inferred using SIM or information supplied by the network operator.
>
> Perhaps B:
> In some deployments, a trusted network may also
> be inferred using information supplied by SIM or the network operator.
> -->
>
>
> 13) <!-- [rfced] We have a question about "it SHOULD", which appears in the second
> sentence of each block of text below (first sentence is included for context).
> Should "it SHOULD" be updated to "they SHOULD", "this mitigation SHOULD", or
> something similar? We believe that the pronoun "it" refers to "network-level
> controls" in the first text block and to "rate limits" in the second text block.
>
> Original:
> *Limitations:* Network level controls may not always be feasible,
> especially when dealing with consumer scenarios where the network may
> not be under control of the service provider. Even if it is possible
> to deploy network level controls, it SHOULD be used in conjunction
> with other controls outlined in this document to achieve defence in-
> depth.
> ...
> *Limitations:* Rate limits are effective at slowing an attacker down
> and help to degrade scaled attacks, but they do not prevent more
> targeted attacks that are executed with lower volumes and velocity.
> Therefore, it should be used along with other techniques to provide a
> defense-in-depth defense against cross-device attacks.
>
> Perhaps:
> *Limitations:* Network-level controls may not always be feasible,
> especially when dealing with consumer scenarios where the network may
> not be under control of the service provider. Even if it is possible
> to deploy network-level controls, they SHOULD be used in conjunction
> with other controls outlined in this document to achieve defense in
> depth.
> ...
> *Limitations:* Rate limits are effective at slowing an attacker down
> and help to degrade scaled attacks, but they do not prevent more
> targeted attacks that are executed with lower volumes and velocity.
> Therefore, they should be used along with other techniques to provide a
> defense-in-depth defense against cross-device attacks.
> -->
>
>
> 14) <!-- [rfced] In the sentences below, would it be helpful to clarify "the
> standard"?
>
> Original:
>
> In addition to the security considerations section in the standard,
> it is RECOMMENDED that one or more of the mitigations outlined in
> this document be considered, especially mitigations that can help
> establish proximity or prevent attackers from obtaining QR or user
> codes.
> ...
> In addition to the security considerations section in the standard,
> it is RECOMMENDED that one or more of the mitigations outlined in
> this document be considered, especially mitigations that can help
> establish proximity or prevent attackers from initiating
> authorization requests.
>
> Perhaps:
>
> In addition to the Security Considerations section in [RFC8628],
> it is RECOMMENDED that one or more of the mitigations outlined in
> this document be considered, especially mitigations that can help
> establish proximity or prevent attackers from obtaining QR or user
> codes.
> ...
> In addition to the Security Considerations section in [CIBA],
> it is RECOMMENDED that one or more of the mitigations outlined in
> this document be considered, especially mitigations that can help
> establish proximity or prevent attackers from initiating
> authorization requests.
> -->
>
>
> 15) <!-- [rfced] What is the subject of the sentence below? Specifically, what does
> "less susceptible" refer to?
>
> Original:
>
> Less susceptible to unauthenticated channel attacks, but still
> vulnerable to attackers who know or can guess the user identifier and
> initiate an attack as described in Section 4.3.4.1.
>
> Perhaps:
>
> CIBA is less susceptible to unauthenticated channel attacks, but it is still
> vulnerable to attackers who know or can guess the user identifier and
> initiate an attack as described in Section 4.3.4.1.
>
> -->
>
>
> 16) <!-- [rfced] Would adding a section number to indicate where readers can find
> examples 1-6 be helpful here? Also, should "examples 1-6" be updated to
> "examples B1-B6"?
>
> Original:
> The Cross-Device Authentication flow proves proximity by leveraging
> BLE advertisements for service establishment, significantly reducing
> the susceptibility to any of the exploits described in Examples 1-6.
>
> Perhaps:
> The Cross-Device Authentication flow proves proximity by leveraging
> BLE advertisements for service establishment, significantly reducing
> the susceptibility to any of the exploits described in examples 1-6
> in Section 4.3.
> -->
>
>
> 17) <!-- [rfced] Please review the following questions regarding the References
> section of this document:
>
> a) Would you like the references to be alphabetized or left in their current order?
>
> b) FYI - The reference entries below contained outdated information based
> on the URLs provided, so we have updated them to match the information
> found at the URLs. Please review the changes made to the following
> reference entries:
>
> [W3CWebAuthn]
> [OpenID.VP]
> [OpenID.Core]
> [W3C.DCAPI]
>
> c) FYI - The original URL for the reference [NEWDCPHISH] is no longer valid
> (https://o365blog.com/post/phishing/#new-phishing-technique-device-code-authentication).
> It appears the author moved their blog to a new domain
> (https://x.com/DrAzureAD/status/1579875043563438080). We have updated this
> reference to use the newer URL.
>
> Original:
> [NEWDCPHISH]
> Syynimaa, N., "Introducing a new phishing technique for
> compromising Office 365 accounts", October 2020,
> <https://o365blog.com/post/phishing/#new-phishing-
> technique-device-code-authentication>.
>
> Updated:
> [NEWDCPHISH]
> Syynimaa, N., "Introducing a new phishing technique for
> compromising Office 365 accounts", October 2020,
> <https://aadinternals.com/post/phishing/>.
>
>
> d) FYI - The original URL for the reference [DCATTACK] redirects to an updated
> page
> (https://www.secureworks.com/blog/oauths-device-code-flow-abused-in-phishing-attacks).
> It appears Secureworks was acquired by Sophos in February 2025
> (https://www.sophos.com/en-us/secureworks-sophos-acquistion). We have updated
> this reference to match the information at the new URL. Please let us know if
> you have any objections.
>
> Original:
> [DCATTACK] Secureworks Counter Threat Unit (CTU), "OAuth's Device
> Code Flow Abused in Phishing Attacks", August 2021,
> <https://www.secureworks.com/blog/oauths-device-code-flow-
> abused-in-phishing-attacks>.
>
> Updated:
> [DCATTACK] Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team, "OAuth's
> Device Code Flow Abused in Phishing Attacks", June 2021,
> <https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/oauths-device-code-
> flow-abused-in-phishing-attacks>.
> -->
>
>
> 18) <!-- [rfced] Terminology
>
> a) We note inconsistencies in the terms below throughout the text. Should these
> be uniform? If so, please let us know which form is preferred.
>
> Authorization Server
> authorization server
>
> sender-constrained tokens
> sender-constraining tokens
>
> defense in depth
> defence in-depth
> defence-in-depth defence
> Note: We updated to use "defense" (with "s"). We see that the NIST Glossary, which is an informative reference for this document, uses "defense-in-depth" with hyphens (see https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/defense_in_depth). This term has not been used often in the RFC Series. We see a few instances of "defense in depth" (open) and "defense-in-depth" (hyphenated) in published RFCs. The hyphenated forms are mostly used in the attributive position (i.e., before a noun) such as "defense-in-depth approach". Also will readers know what this term means? Should it be added to Section 1.4 ("Conventions and Terminology")?
>
>
> b) In general text, should the names of patterns be capitalized or lowercased? We
> see both forms in the document.
>
> Lowercase:
> Examples of the user-transferred authorization data pattern include
> flows in which the Consumption Device requests the Authorization
> Server ...
>
> In the backchannel-transferred session pattern, the client requests
> the authorization server to authenticate the user and obtain
> authorization for an action.
>
> In cross-device flows that follow the user-transferred authorization
> data pattern, the client ...
>
> Attackers exploit the user-transferred authorization data pattern by
> combining the social engineering techniques ...
>
> Capitalized:
> ... using the Backchannel-Transferred Session pattern only after
> the user is already authenticated and attempts a high-value
> transaction.
>
> In the User-Transferred Session Data Pattern, users MAY enter out-of-
> band information on the Consumption Device to start the authorization
> process.
>
> ... on the primary device (Backchannel-Transferred Session
> Pattern, Section 3.1.2).
>
> ... to approve the authentication
> attempt on the primary device (User-Transferred Session Data
> Pattern, Section 3.1.1).
>
>
> c) Would you like to make the following capitalization changes per usage in RFCs
> 8628 and 6749? Or do you prefer the current capitalization?
>
> "Device Authorization Grant" to "device authorization grant" (per RFC 8628)
> "Authorization Code Grant" to "authorization code grant" (per RFC 6749)
> "Authorization Code Flow" to "authorization code flow" (per RFC 6749)
>
>
> d) We see the following forms in the document; we did not make any changes as
> the meaning is clear, but let us know if you would like for the usage to be
> consistent. Note that plurals of these forms also appear in the document.
>
> user code or QR code
> user or QR code
> QR code or user code
> QR or user code
> -->
>
>
> 19) <!-- [rfced] Abbreviations
>
> a) FYI - We have expanded the following abbreviation per Section 3.6 of RFC 7322
> ("RFC Style Guide"). Please review to ensure correctness.
>
> Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)
>
> b) How may we expand the abbreviations below?
>
> TPM
> SIM
> FAPI
> SATMC
>
> c) The abbreviation CIBA is expanded multiple times in the document; in fact,
> it is expanded every time it is used except for two instances. Would you like
> to expand the first instance in the text and then use the abbreviation after?
> -->
>
>
> 20) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online
> Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>
> and let us know if any changes are needed. Updates of this nature typically
> result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers.
>
> For example, please consider whether "native" and "traditional" should be
> updated throughout.
>
> While the NIST website
> <https://web.archive.org/web/20250214092458/https://www.nist.gov/nist-research-library/nist-technical-series-publications-author-instructions#table1>
> indicates that "traditional" is potentially biased, it is also ambiguous.
> "Traditional" is a subjective term, as it is not the same for everyone.
>
> -->
>
>
> Thank you.
>
> Kaelin Foody and Rebecca VanRheenen
> RFC Production Center
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> On Jul 30, 2026, at 9:38 PM, [email protected] wrote:
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> Final Review for RFC-to-be 10027 <draft-ietf-oauth-cross-device-security>
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> --------------------------------------
> RFC 10027 (draft-ietf-oauth-cross-device-security)
>
> Title : Cross-Device Flows: Security Best Current Practice
> Author(s) : P. Kasselman,
> D. Fett,
> F. Skokan
> WG Chair(s) : Hannes Tschofenig, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
> Area Director(s) : Deb Cooley, Christopher Inacio
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