Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the fact
that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to unilaterally
(ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins is more secure in
extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg attacks (as unfeasibly
expensive they may be); the only large-scale (>100 block) reorganization the
non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore
render the replay threat moot.
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-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable
Local Time: June 7, 2017 3:04 AM
UTC Time: June 7, 2017 12:04 AM
From: [email protected]
To: Kekcoin <[email protected]>
Anthony Towns <[email protected]>, [email protected]
<[email protected]>
You keep referring to 148 coinbase coins, what is the rationale behind this?
Why would you prefer using 148 coinbases over legacy coinbases for this purpose?
OK, maybe "post-UASF coinbase coins" is a better term? I just wanted to make it
clear that this refers to coins that come from blocks generated after the UASF
is activated.
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On Jun 6, 2017, at 4:59 PM, Kekcoin <[email protected]> wrote:
You keep referring to 148 coinbase coins, what is the rationale behind this?
Why would you prefer using 148 coinbases over legacy coinbases for this purpose?
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