> Please read my email more carefully; the replay threat would be moot because > there would be no alternative chain to replay the TX on,
In order to *get to that point*, you need >51%. Not only that, but, if you started out with <51%, then you need >>51% in order to *catch up* and replace the large number of blocks added to the legacy chain in the mean time. So, since >51% is _required_ for BIP148 to succeed (and likely >>51%)... you might as well do as SegWit did originally, or lower the threshold to 80% or something (as BIP91 does). Without replay protection at the outset, BIP148, as far as I can tell, isn't a threat to miners. -- Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA. > On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:29 PM, Kekcoin <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Please read my email more carefully; the replay threat would be moot because > there would be no alternative chain to replay the TX on, as the non-148 chain > would have been reorganized into oblivion. > > > Sent with ProtonMail <https://protonmail.com/> Secure Email. > >> -------- Original Message -------- >> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable >> Local Time: June 7, 2017 3:26 AM >> UTC Time: June 7, 2017 12:26 AM >> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> To: Kekcoin <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Anthony Towns <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>, >> [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> >> <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> I don't know what you mean by "render the replay threat moot." >> >> If you don't have replay protection, replay is always a threat. A very >> serious one. >> >> -- >> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing >> with the NSA. >> >>> On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:19 PM, Kekcoin <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the >>> fact that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to >>> unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins >>> is more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg >>> attacks (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only large-scale (>100 >>> block) reorganization the non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the >>> chainsplit and therefore render the replay threat moot. >>> >
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