> The current proposal kind-of limits the potential damage by still committing > to the prevout amount, but it still seems a big risk for all the people that > reuse addresses, which seems to be just about everyone.
The typical address re-use doesn't apply here as this is a sighash flag that would only really be used for doing various contracts on Bitcoin. I don't see any reason why "regular" wallets would update to use this sighash flag. We've also seen first hand with segwit that wallet authors are slow to pull in the latest and greatest features available, even if they solve nuisance issues like malleability and can result in lower fees. IMO, sighash_none is an even bigger footgun that already exists in the protocol today. -- Laolu On Tue, May 8, 2018 at 7:41 AM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev < email@example.com> wrote: > On Mon, May 07, 2018 at 09:40:46PM +0200, Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > Given the general enthusiasm, and lack of major criticism, for the > > `SIGHASH_NOINPUT` proposal, [...] > > So first, I'm not sure if I'm actually criticising or playing devil's > advocate here, but either way I think criticism always helps produce > the best proposal, so.... > > The big concern I have with _NOINPUT is that it has a huge failure > case: if you use the same key for multiple inputs and sign one of them > with _NOINPUT, you've spent all of them. The current proposal kind-of > limits the potential damage by still committing to the prevout amount, > but it still seems a big risk for all the people that reuse addresses, > which seems to be just about everyone. > > I wonder if it wouldn't be ... I'm not sure better is the right word, > but perhaps "more realistic" to have _NOINPUT be a flag to a signature > for a hypothetical "OP_CHECK_SIG_FOR_SINGLE_USE_KEY" opcode instead, > so that it's fundamentally not possible to trick someone who regularly > reuses keys to sign something for one input that accidently authorises > spends of other inputs as well. > > Is there any reason why an OP_CHECKSIG_1USE (or OP_CHECKMULTISIG_1USE) > wouldn't be equally effective for the forseeable usecases? That would > ensure that a _NOINPUT signature is only ever valid for keys deliberately > intended to be single use, rather than potentially valid for every key. > > It would be ~34 witness bytes worse than being able to spend a Schnorr > aggregate key directly, I guess; but that's not worse than the normal > taproot tradeoff: you spend the aggregate key directly in the normal, > cooperative case; and reserve the more expensive/NOINPUT case for the > unusual, uncooperative cases. I believe that works fine for eltoo: in > the cooperative case you just do a SIGHASH_ALL spend of the original > transaction, and _NOINPUT isn't needed. > > Maybe a different opcode maybe makes sense at a "philosophical" level: > normal signatures are signing a spend of a particular "coin" (in the > UTXO sense), while _NOINPUT signatures are in some sense signing a spend > of an entire "wallet" (all the coins spendable by a particular key, or > more accurately for the current proposal, all the coins of a particular > value spendable by a particular key). Those are different intentions, > so maybe it's reasonable to encode them in different addresses, which > in turn could be done by having a new opcode for _NOINPUT. > > A new opcode has the theoretical advantage that it could be deployed > into the existing segwit v0 address space, rather than waiting for segwit > v1. Not sure that's really meaningful, though. > > Cheers, > aj > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > firstname.lastname@example.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >
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