Transaction initiated and signed on device #1.  Transaction is sent to device 
#2.  On device #2 you verify the transaction and if authorized you provide the 
second signature.

Brian Erdelyi

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 2, 2015, at 5:09 PM, Pedro Worcel <pe...@worcel.com> wrote:
> 
> Where would you verify that?
> 
>> On 2/3/2015 10:03 AM, Brian Erdelyi wrote:
>> Joel,
>> 
>> The mobile device should show you the details of the transaction (i.e. 
>> amount and bitcoin address).  Once you verify this is the intended recipient 
>> and amount you approve it on the mobile device.  If the address was 
>> replaced, you should see this on the mobile device as it won’t match where 
>> you were intending to send it.  You can then not provide the second 
>> signature.
>> 
>> Brian Erdelyi
>> 
>>> On Feb 2, 2015, at 4:57 PM, Joel Joonatan Kaartinen 
>>> <joel.kaarti...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> If the attacker has your desktop computer but not the mobile that's acting 
>>> as an independent second factor, how are you then supposed to be able to 
>>> tell you're not signing the correct transaction on the mobile? If the 
>>> address was replaced with the attacker's address, it'll look like 
>>> everything is ok.
>>> 
>>> - Joel
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 9:58 PM, Brian Erdelyi <brian.erde...@gmail.com> 
>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> > Confusing or not, the reliance on multiple signatures as offering 
>>>> > greater security than single relies on the independence of multiple 
>>>> > secrets. If the secrets cannot be shown to retain independence in the 
>>>> > envisioned threat scenario (e.g. a user's compromised operating system) 
>>>> > then the benefit reduces to making the exploit more difficult to write, 
>>>> > which, once written, reduces to no benefit. Yet the user still           
>>>> >                 suffers the reduced utility arising from greater 
>>>> > complexity, while being led to believe in a false promise.
>>>> 
>>>> Just trying to make sure I understand what you’re saying.  Are you eluding 
>>>> to that if two of the three private keys get compromised there is no gain 
>>>> in security?  Although the likelihood of this occurring is lower, it is 
>>>> possible.
>>>> 
>>>> As more malware targets bitcoins I think the utility is evident.  Given 
>>>> how final Bitcoin transactions are, I think it’s worth trying to find 
>>>> methods to help verify those transactions (if a user deems it to be 
>>>> high-risk enough) before the transaction is completed.  The balance is 
>>>> trying to devise something that users do not find too burdensome.
>>>> 
>>>> Brian Erdelyi
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>> 
>> 
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