> Confusing or not, the reliance on multiple signatures as offering greater 
> security than single relies on the independence of multiple secrets. If the 
> secrets cannot be shown to retain independence in the envisioned threat 
> scenario (e.g. a user's compromised operating system) then the benefit 
> reduces to making the exploit more difficult to write, which, once written, 
> reduces to no benefit. Yet the user still suffers the reduced utility arising 
> from greater complexity, while being led to believe in a false promise.

Just trying to make sure I understand what you’re saying.  Are you eluding to 
that if two of the three private keys get compromised there is no gain in 
security?  Although the likelihood of this occurring is lower, it is possible.

As more malware targets bitcoins I think the utility is evident.  Given how 
final Bitcoin transactions are, I think it’s worth trying to find methods to 
help verify those transactions (if a user deems it to be high-risk enough) 
before the transaction is completed.  The balance is trying to devise something 
that users do not find too burdensome.

Brian Erdelyi
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