OK, since you know the folks involved, let me ask you about how this bears
on Korea. Why doesn't this show that we only need a few tank companies to
stop all the North Korean tanks? Are North Korean tanks that much better
than those from Iraq? Is the difference in terrain important? At face
value, you would seem to be presenting an arguement against the need for
land mines in Korea.
Dan M.
First, let me say that I'm posting from home using the Kennedy School's
ludicrous web-based e-mail system, so my attributions and such will
probably be messed up a lot. My apologies to anyone I do this to, as I did
to you, Dan, in my last post.
OK - there are four major differences in the Korean Peninsula that make
defening it a much harder task than ejecting the Iraqis from Kuwait. They
can be described, essentially, as climate, terrain, space, and initiative.
In order:
The desert climate for the Gulf War is often described as ideal for
American weapons. This is not entirely correct - they were, after all,
designed for use in Central Europe, not the Gulf, and the period of the
Gulf War was marked by the worst weather in the Gulf this century.
Nevertheless, that climate was far more suitable for mobile mechanized
operations than that of the Korean peninsula, which has legendarily bad
weather that would greatly inhibit American air power.
Terrain. The Korean peninsula is mountainous. Although this usually helps
the defender, in the particular case of American forces versus the North
Koreans, I think that American forces would probably prefer open plains.
FM 100-5, the revolutionary late 1970s document that created the modern
American style of war, specifies the AirLand battle, which relies on
mobility and attacks in depth to defeat a numerically superior force. The
mobility of American forces would obviously be greatly constricted by the
mountains, and, in fact, greatly constricted by the fact that the Korean
peninsula is relatively narrow, making war there far more of a slugging
match than the fast-paced mobile war of the Gulf.
Space - I sort of covered this in the last bit, but some additional points.
One of the major factors in Allied success in the Gulf was that American
forces were equipped with GPS systems that allowed them to navigate in the
desert, while Iraqi forces had to stick to the roads. American forces were
consistently able to hit the Iraqis from the flanks and rear - the famous
"left hook" led by Fred Franks that smashed the Republican Guard divisions
in Southern Iraq was the best example of this. Again, the Korean Peninsula
is not conducive to this sort of battle. Furthermore, the AirLand battle
presumes the ability to hit every echelon of an enemy's forces
simultaneously - but North Korea has one of the densest (if not the
densest) SAM belts in the world, making this very difficult for Allied air
forces. Finally, while I have no doubt that given, say 300 miles, Allied
forces could smash the North Korean army and take minimal casualties in
exchange, they don't have 300 miles - Seoul is, I believe, 30 miles from
the DMZ, and nobody wants to do urban warfare in Seoul. Thus Allied
forces are committed to a forward defense, and forward defenses are
traditionally very difficult on the defender and involve very high
casualties.
Initiative. Traditionally the advantage in battle goes to the defender,
but this is not necessarily the case in modern battle. The Gulf had a
highly mobile force attacking a completely immobile defending one. In that
situation, the advantage can actually go to a skillful attacker who has the
initiative and can take his opponent by surprise repeatedly. Needless to
say, American forces in the Gulf were _very_ skillful and used this to
great effect. That's exactly what McMaster did, in fact. In Korea, the
initiative would, at least initially, be with the North Koreans. While I
cannot evaluate the skill of North Korean commanders, normal prudence
dictates that they be considered at least as skillful as their American and
South Korean counterparts.
Put all of those elements together, and you can see that the task of the
Commander of Allied Forces in South Korea (I can't remember his formal
title, but he's always an American in time of war, something that the South
Koreans are, understandably, not terribly happy about) has a fairly
difficult task. There's no doubt in my mind that the North Koreans would
be defeated, and probably by the forces that are in-theatre at the time -
but it would be brutal and bloody and every little bit counts. The
Pentagon, which has, after all, 37,000 American lives on the line, plus
uncounted South Koreans, doesn't want to lose any more than it has to.
Two further elements. First, although the US has not signed the treaty,
the landmines in South Korea are technically South Korean property. The
only civilians killed are, of course, South Koreans. South Korea has a
democratically elected government. South Korea has also not signed the
treaty. There is, to my mind, a phenomenal arrogance on the part of people
who are willing to tell the democratic South Korean government what it can
or cannot do in defending its people from the Stalinist regime to the
north. Surely it is the South Korean government that has the most right,
and is best fit, to make these determinations. This arrogance is perhaps
worse when those people and countries are doing absolutely nothing to help
the South Koreans protect themselves, and castigate those who do. Tensions
along the DMZ are extremely high. I have friends who have been stationed
there who have been _shot at_ by the North Koreans, who regularly take
sniper shots, and even the occasional artillery barrage, across the b
order.
Second, I have several military friends who have been over to South Korea
recently for briefings on the situation. They all thought that whatever
the diplomats might be saying, judging by the forces on the ground and the
behavior of the North Korean army, that they thought the North would be
coming South, and probably fairly soon. While I cannot evalute the
accuracy of their perceptions - I haven't seen the data myself, for obvious
reasons - you don't get to be a Colonel in the United States army (which
two of them are) without knowing what you are talking about.
Finally - Larry Bond's book Red Phoenix is an excellent, although somewhat
dated, fictionalization of a hypothetical Second Korean War.
Gautam
