----- Original Message ----- From: "Richard Baker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, July 21, 2002 3:23 PM Subject: Re: Atheism Re: CD's
> Dan said: > > > Isn't consciousness no better established than God and free will? > > I'm not sure. There seem to be two obvious routes to an investigation of > consciousness. Firstly, there is a Cartesian approach based on > introspection. That is plenty good enough to convince me of the > "vividness" of my conscious experiences. I agree, but it is not something that you can show me. So, it is an exception to the naturalist rules for valid evidence. The question is why one would reject as utter nonsense other aspects of one's vivid conscious experience. For example, the understanding of being an agent of action is fairly common I can understand saying they are not part of science; they are not. I can understand arguing that they are unproven; they certainly are. But, the reason for rejecting them as clearly false, when one decides to not reject the experience of consciousness; which is no more emperically based, isn't obvious to me. Its clear that rejecting consciousness is not going to get a philsopher very far in convincing people. However, it seems to me that should be used as a means of saying: At least some things that cannot be proven emperically are true. This leads the question as to what other things that cannot be proven emperically might be true. It seems to me that, case by case, the factual statement is "I dunno." Other statements are based on faith. >Secondly, there is Dennett's > heterophenomenological method, which treats people's reports of their > experiences of consciousness as the proper subjects of investigation. > I'm moderately willing to grant on the basis of these > heterophenomenonological testimonies that other people have the same > kinds of vivid conscious experiences that I do. Yea, but why isn't he willing to grant even a "maybe" to other reports, like initiating action willingly. > Now, though, for some caveats. I think that the argument above is shaky > in several respects. Indeed, it seems that Dennett himself is arguing > that we each trick ourselves into thinking that we have conscious > experiences, so that we're all self-deluding zombies. He almost has to. >In that case, I suppose consciousness is a theory we each invent about ourselves, which > explains all the data but whose abstract structures don't map onto > actual things "out there". But its more complicated than that. It needs to be reduced to a meme that is false but useful; with no more validity than free will. However, since our prime experience on which we base everything else is "I perceive", how can anything be true if that is false? >Furthermore, I find it hard to imagine what > sorts of structures in the world might be isomorphic to the > "experiencelets" that make up our conscious experience - it almost > seems to require a whole new physics of conscious experiences whose > connection to the more familiar physics of particles and fields would > be highly problematic. I think it would require that QM is false in a way the caloric fluid theory of heat is false, not in the way that classical mechanics is false. Well, we're not quite there yet. Penrose thinks that mesoscopic physics will have drastically new stuff that will explain both consciousness and free will. I don't think that's impossible; but I have grave doubts. We should know within my lifetime, I think. > Rich > GCU Tying Myself In Knots Dan M. I don't have to tie myself in knots because I Kant
