> The air campaign helped some, but Nazis were still > able to increase > production until the very end of the war.
IMHO, the real effect the Air War had on Germany was both tactical and through attrittion. It doesn't matter that the Germans were able to maximize production in 1944 (sometime around March or so, IIRC). The real effect was that the bombing campaigns drew the Luftwaffe over Germany rather than dispersed to meet a possible allied invasion, and further the constant attrition of aircrews had a very significant effect on the Luftwaffe's ability to counter Allied airpower when it really mattered -- over France and the Low countries. Secondly, although airpower was not decisive, it greatly hindered the German's ability to maneuver while at the same time protecting Allied forces and allowing THEM to maneuver. The result was the Falaise Pocket and the destruction of the bulk of the Wehrmacht's equipment and troops. This was partially due to being entrapped and the crews abandoning their vehicles, and because of a lack of fuel/spares. German losses were staggering: they started the Normandy campaign with something in the neighbourhood of 1000-1500 tanks; they lost nearly every one of them. I would posit then that the true benefit of the air campaigns was not in production costs, but in the ability of the German army to defend itself from allied predators. Damon. ===== ------------------------------------------------------------ Damon Agretto [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum." http://www.geocities.com/garrand.geo/index.html Now Building: ------------------------------------------------------------ __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - Helps protect you from nasty viruses. http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
