--- Damon Agretto <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > IMHO, the real effect the Air War had on Germany was > both tactical and through attrittion. It doesn't > matter that the Germans were able to maximize > production in 1944 (sometime around March or so, > IIRC). The real effect was that the bombing > campaigns > drew the Luftwaffe over Germany rather than > dispersed > to meet a possible allied invasion, and further the > constant attrition of aircrews had a very > significant > effect on the Luftwaffe's ability to counter Allied > airpower when it really mattered -- over France and > the Low countries. Secondly, although airpower was > not > decisive, it greatly hindered the German's ability > to > maneuver while at the same time protecting Allied > forces and allowing THEM to maneuver. The result was > the Falaise Pocket and the destruction of the bulk > of > the Wehrmacht's equipment and troops. This was > partially due to being entrapped and the crews > abandoning their vehicles, and because of a lack of > fuel/spares. German losses were staggering: they > started the Normandy campaign with something in the > neighbourhood of 1000-1500 tanks; they lost nearly > every one of them. I would posit then that the true > benefit of the air campaigns was not in production > costs, but in the ability of the German army to > defend > itself from allied predators. > > Damon.
Damon - how do you feel about the argument (which I find plausible) that the strategic bombing campaign actually massively limited German equipment production? In essence (I'm sure you're familiar with the case, I'm just laying it out as I understand it) Germany didn't fully mobilize for war until 1943-44, if then, as Hitler was extremely reluctant to impose the deprivations on his civilian population that total mobilization would entail. As such, German production increased in 1944 as a result of the diversion of civilian production to the military economy, certainly. But if you compare the increase in production to the multiple order of magnitude increases achieved by the US, unhindered by strategic bombing, it seems at least plausible that the strategic bombing campaigns actually had a very large impact on the ability of German industry to arm the Wehrmacht. Do you feel this is a reasonable assessment? In terms of your assessment of the overall effect of airpower - it seems unquestionable to me that the 9th Air Force's tactical support of the ground forces was a very effective use of air power, probably more effective than the 8th's strategic bombing campaigns (despite my argument above). But, while German losses on the Western front were high, it doesn't seem to me that they were nearly as high as German losses on the _Eastern_ front. Now, if you agree with this assessment, this leads to two questions: 1. To what extent were German casualties on the Eastern Front a product of Russian air superiority? 2. To what extent was Russian air superiority a product of the losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe by the British and American air campaigns? My gut instinct is that the answer to 1 is not so much and 2 is a great deal, but I definitely want to hear your much-more-informed opinion. ===== Gautam Mukunda [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Freedom is not free" http://www.mukunda.blogspot.com _______________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Win 1 of 4,000 free domain names from Yahoo! Enter now. http://promotions.yahoo.com/goldrush _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
