At 08:39 AM Tuesday 11/28/2006, Dan Minette wrote:
> -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On > Behalf Of Ritu > Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 3:37 AM > To: 'Killer Bs Discussion' > Subject: RE: Iraq Re: "Someone Must Tell Them" > > > On the other hand, the policy of sanctions, No-Fly-Zones, > > diplomatic isolation, etc. was given something on the order > > of 10+ years to work. > > And, to refresh my memory, which one of these policies was aimed at > *removing* Saddam instead of containing him, and neutralising the threat > posed by him? Sanctions and diplomatic isolation are, typically, the strongest non-military techniques the world has to push for regime change. This is what was attempted with Cuba, South Africa, and North Korea, for example. It is true that, in cases where the US has a great deal of influence (say the Philippines), regime change can be afforded by using influence (in that case the US convinced members of the Philippines military to stand down when Marcos wanted them to stop a regime change via elections). But, I think it is safe to say that outside countries had little leverage with the leadership in Iraq. The best chance for regime change came right after Gulf War I. Hussein had been humiliated; his army had totally collapsed against the US. The US supported uprisings within the country, which were stamped down quickly, efficiently, and mercilessly. What we didn't take into account was the fact that the Republican Guard had been held out of the fighting, was intact, and still strongly loyal. The US and Britain then instituted no-fly zones, in an effort to reduce Hussein's ability to attack the Shiites and the Kurds. AFAIK, it was an unprecedented limitation of the sovereign power within a country, outside of a war of course. As a result of this, the Kurds were able to hold their own in the North, and run that part of Iraq as a semi-autonomous region. I know that regime change was a goal of Bush Sr. and Clinton, but not considered an attainable one, short of invasion. Thus, they focused on the lesser goal of containment, after the attempt at regime change failed. One might argue for a targeted assignation,
We send him a[nother] mistress?
but that's problematic in three ways. First, while we tend to focus on the leader himself, eliminating that one person doesn't eliminate the dictatorship. The best we could reasonable hope for is that a less talented dictator takes over. Our hopes for a quick regime change in N. Korea were based on Kim Jr. not having the chops of Kim Sr. In all likelihood, he doesn't, but he's in power 12 years later. So, if we magically got rid of Hussein, the next in line (say his brother or Chemical Ali) would not represent a regime change. Second, during both Gulf Wars, we did include command and control as legitimate bombing targets. Neither time did we get Hussein. Even after we control Iraq, it took quite a while to find him. Third, these techniques have been declared illegal in the US, mostly for reasons of self interest. We did try them with Castro, to no avail. Since the Kennedy assignation,
Marilyn? Or another one?
we saw that the use of this technique as a means of could risk starting big wars that no-one wants. In particular, no one wanted the USSR to think "it's the USA" if the chairman of the communist party were to be killed. Given the problems we have with asymmetric war now, I don't think Western governments want to put this on the table. AQ and Bin Laden are different, of course, because they are not a government. And, the US and Britain actually bombed military targets when Hussein stonewalled inspections. The next step after bombing is a military campaign involving boots on the ground. Indeed, I could argue that Iraq between the Gulf Wars could be used as an example of trying everything short of invasion, with no success. Dan M.
Aren't Spell Checkers Fun Maru -- Ronn! :) _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
