Not even close. Right now our FOBs are closed to most Iraqis, even those that work there. They have to go home to their families off post, and the risk against their families is great.
Also we are suing primarily regular line infantry for patrolling. Having been on both the SOF and conventional sides of the house I can tell you that line infantry is very good at killing, and not good for much else. Having a battalion roll through with strikers and Abrams and shit is not going to help in the long run. It's a strange case but often times 12 en can do a much better job than 1200. > -----Original Message----- > From: Sam [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Tuesday, August 22, 2006 3:22 PM > To: CF-Community > Subject: Re: A Self-Defeating War > > Isn't this what we've neen doing? > > > On 8/21/06, Loathe wrote: > > 1. Small teams of MI and SF set up mobile operating bases in the local > > communities. > > > > 2. These teams recruit and train a local defense force. > > > > 3.* a. > > The camps are expanded to allow those that work for the SOF teams > families > > to move into a protected haven. They are also given better food, > and > > access to material goods, like cable tv and the internet. > > > > 4. In camp mayoral elections are held. No parties are allowed. > > > > 5. After 6 months state-wide mayoral council is held to elect state > > executives and legislature(possibly similar to county, maybe even tribal > > government). > > > > 6. After 6 months state assembly meets to define and elect the federal > > executive and legislature. > > > > 3.* b. > > Parralell to the gorwth of the civil infrastructure, the mlitary, > civil > > defense, and law enforcment arms at local state and federal > level are in > > the process of being trained by the U.S. Military, the CIA, the FBI, and > the > > State Departments DSS, not to mention "security aid" from USAID. > > > > 4. Battalion sized federal army elements begin patrolling with crew > served > > weapon support the largest weapon allowed. No explosives other than > > grenades and AT-4s. Small Iraqi national specially trained MI assets > are > > planted back into the community, as moles, to root out the insurgency. > > > > 5. By this point the local SF teams have built a company or more of > local > > irregular forces. They are based, with their families, out of the > mobile > > operating bases. These groups begin patrolling out of their > strongholds, > > and work to secure surrounding towns and villages. A tight reign is > > required on these forces as they are not as highly trained as the > regular > > forces are. > > > > 6. A year or so in, firefights have dropped quickly. Government exists > > from the local to the central level. Security is primarily done by > native > > Iraqi forces, with American Special Operations quick reation force(s) > (QRFs) > > stashed around the theater for support, advice, training and assistance. > > > > How does that sound? > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Introducing the Fusion Authority Quarterly Update. 80 pages of hard-hitting, up-to-date ColdFusion information by your peers, delivered to your door four times a year. http://www.fusionauthority.com/quarterly Archive: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/CF-Community/message.cfm/messageid:213870 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/CF-Community/subscribe.cfm Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=89.70.5
