This is a simple case of you both reading the same thing, and coming away with different conclusions. Not surprising...you are two different people with two completely different outlooks on life. Not sure the arguing is going to get you anywhere.
When I read this, I come away with a simple fact: Iraq's WMD "program" was not an immediate threat to the United States. On Fri, Sep 16, 2011 at 11:24 AM, Sam <[email protected]> wrote: > > Scroll down a bit: > > Growth Media R&D > ISG judges that beginning in the 1990s Iraq decided indigenously to > research and produce nutrient growth media that could be used to > produce multiple strains of bacteria to include B. anthracis, but no > direct evidence has yet been uncovered that this media was used to > produce B. anthracis post-1991. Dr. Rihab described to ISG her BW > groups research in developing indigenously produced media to > circumvent the effects sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1990 > invasion. > > Dr. Al Madhihi was responsible for the development of an indigenously > produced media with ingredients that did not come under UN scrutiny as > a result of the sanctions against Iraq. Importantly, laboratory > notebooks suggest the media was very effective in inducing nearly one > hundred percent sporulation of the B. thuringiensis, a known simulant > for the BW agent B. anthracis, with few or no additives or intensive > monitoring of the fermentation process. > During January 2004, ISG obtained a laboratory notebook dating back to > 1989 detailing experiments conducted using Dr. Al Madhihis locally > produced milk byproduct/corn byproduct media and the B. thuringiensis > variant Kenyae with impressive sporulation results. The notebook > outlined experiments concerning the effect of different concentrations > of the media and additives on sporulation of B. thuringiensis. These > results were consistent with the claims made for the effectiveness of > the media. One experiment detailed in the notebook showed that per > 24-48 hours growth of B. thuringiensis in this locally produced media, > there was 100 per cent spore growth with a resulting viable count of > 1.2x108 to 5.6x108 per milliliter. > Dr. Al Madhihis media was essential to a possible Iraqi BW program > as the media was made up of the simple local ingredients, which are > both by-products of other food production processes. The milk > byproduct, in particular, is a waste product. At Al Hakam, the corn > byproduct was made from cornstarch produced at the Al Hashimiyah State > Factory in Al Hillah near Babylon. The milk byproduct was obtained > from an unnamed dairy at Abu Ghurayb. Besides being indigenous and > cheap it was impossible to monitor or account as part of a UN > verification process. > This locally produced media were utilized in the B. thuringiensis > production process at Al Hakam and with growth requirements of B. > thuringiensis being very close to B. anthracis, the whey/CSL media > could potentially have been used at Al Hakam to produce B. anthracis. > Dr. Rihab and Thamir Abd-al-Rahman, the director of the B. anthracis > project at Al Hakam, have both stated in interviews to ISG that they > are unaware of any tests on growing B. anthracis in the milk and corn > byproduct media. This is an odd statement because both individuals > co-authored a document that evaluated various growth media for growing > Bacillus species including B. anthracison such a commercially > available media. > Thamir goes further to state that there was no reason to replace the > modified G medium declared as used in the anthrax programs as it was > reliable, produced high sporulation rates and was made from simple > salts commercially available within Iraq, and therefore there was no > need to hide procurement signatures. However, Modified G medium (MGM) > cannot be used alone to grow B. anthracis spores. MGM requires that > the anthrax organism be grown in a very enriched medium first and that > relative large inoculums be used in the last step of fermentation that > uses modified G medium. Thus using an alternative to the enriched > medium and MGM would have a material advantage to minimize sanctions > scrutiny. Furthermore, at the time of production of B. thuringiensis > at Al Hakam, Iraq was under increasing scrutiny on the material > balance of growth media from UNSCOM. > Dr. Rihab admitted to ISG that use of such a locally developed milk > and corn byproduct B. thuringiensis media would permit evading > monitoring of media to track fermentation activity. > > An anthrax experts assessment was that it was highly probable that > this media would achieve similar rates of sporulation in anthrax > production. > Dr. Rihab described to ISG her BW groups research in developing > indigenously produced media to circumvent the effects sanctions > imposed on Iraq after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. > > Dr. Ali Shihab did media work for an unspecified microbe. Shihab was > the lead scientist for Clostridium perfringens development. ISG > assesses that he was probably working on an alternative growth media > for that organism. > Nasr Al Hindawi worked on alternative media for Brucella that was a > candidate BW agent undergoing basic research in the period coinciding > with Desert Storm. > After 1992, Baghdad University worked on plants as a source of > bacteria growth media; the plant media was apparently suitable for > pathogen growth, and Dr. Rihab had expressed her concern that it might > attract the attention of UNSCOM. > Around June 2002, Dr. Al Madhihi produced about five vials of B. > thuringiensis formulated with bentonite and asked Thamir, who was > working with Dr. Al Madhihi twice a week at TABRC, for an assessment > of their viability by re-growing them in a small volume shake flask > culture. One of Dr. Al Madhihis MSc students was working on this > organism, although no other specific reason for this work was given. > Thamir cultured approximately two of the samples, with one of the > resulting cultures exhibiting good activity of 80 to 90 percent > mortality of test organism, the other performed poorly. > > > > On Fri, Sep 16, 2011 at 12:10 PM, Judah McAuley <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > Sam, go read the god damned report yourself. > > > > From the Duelfer Commission Report, which you can find on the CIA site: > > > > "Iraq would have faced great difficulty in re-establishing an > > effective BW agent production capability. Nevertheless, after 1996 > > Iraq still had a significant dual-use capabilitysome declaredreadily > > useful for BW if the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. > > Moreover, Iraq still possessed its most important BW asset, the > > scientific know-how of its BW cadre. > > > > Any attempt to create a new BW program after 1996 would have > > encountered a range of major hurdles. The years following Desert Storm > > wrought a steady degradation of Iraqs industrial base: new equipment > > and spare parts for existing machinery became difficult and expensive > > to obtain, standards of maintenance declined, staff could not receive > > training abroad, and foreign technical assistance was almost > > impossible to get. Additionally, Iraqs infrastructure and public > > utilities were crumbling. New large projects, particularly if they > > required special foreign equipment and expertise, would attract > > international attention. UN monitoring of dual-use facilities up to > > the end of 1998, made their use for clandestine purpose complicated > > and risk laden. > > > > Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary > > BW program within a few weeks to a few months of a decision to do so, > > but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a > > course. > > > > In spite of the difficulties noted above, a BW capability is > > technically the easiest WMD to attain. Although equipment and > > facilities were destroyed under UN supervision in 1996, Iraq retained > > technical BW know-how through the scientists that were involved in the > > former program. ISG has also identified civilian facilities and > > equipment in Iraq that have dual-use application that could be used > > for the production of agent. " > > > > Here's the report if you want to look yourself: > > > https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap6.html > > > > Iraq had no Biological weapons specific infrastructure. Their dual use > > infrastructure is the same that any country would have. Yes, it is > > possible that they could, at some point, have started up a research > > program again. So could virtually any country. The study group found > > no evidence that Iraq had taken any steps to restart their research or > > development program. > > > > I don't have to debunk the Duelfer report because the report itself > > refutes the positions taken in the NRO article. NRO are a bunch of > > Bush apologist hacks. I'm sorry it bothers your world view, Sam, but > > for fucks sake, drop it all ready. The facts belie every single claim > > that Iraq was engaged in any sort of weapons of mass destruction > > program in the years leading up to our attack, no matter who much you > > want to believe the contrary. Saddam was an evil dude, I believe that. > > But our government lied about what he was doing. End of story. > > > > J > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Order the Adobe Coldfusion Anthology now! http://www.amazon.com/Adobe-Coldfusion-Anthology/dp/1430272155/?tag=houseoffusion Archive: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/message.cfm/messageid:342712 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/subscribe.cfm Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/unsubscribe.cfm
