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+ I Bruno Bauer , The Jewish Question , Braunschweig , 1843 The German Jews 
desire emancipation . What kind of emancipation do they desire ? Civic , 
political emancipation . Bruno Bauer replies to them : No one in Germany is 
politically emancipated . We ourselves are not free . How are we to free you ? 
You Jews are egoists if you demand a special emancipation for yourselves as 
Jews . As Germans , you ought to work for the political emancipation of Germany 
, and as human beings , for the emancipation of mankind , and you should feel 
the particular kind of your oppression and your shame not as an exception to 
the rule , but on the contrary as a confirmation of the rule . Or do the Jews 
demand the same status as Christian subjects of the state ? In that case , they 
recognize that the Christian state is justified and they recognize , too , the 
regime of general oppression . Why should they disapprove of their special yoke 
if they approve of the general yoke ? Why should the German be 
 interested in the liberation of the Jew , if the Jew is not interested in the 
liberation of the German ? The Christian state knows only privileges . In this 
state , the Jew has the privilege of being a Jew . As a Jew , he has rights 
which the Christians do not have . Why should he want rights which he does not 
have , but which the Christians enjoy ? In wanting to be emancipated from the 
Christian state , the Jew is demanding that the Christian state should give up 
its religious prejudice . Does he , the Jew , give up his religious prejudice ? 
Has he , then , the right to demand that someone else should renounce his 
religion ? By its very nature , the Christian state is incapable of 
emancipating the Jew ; but , adds Bauer , by his very nature the Jew cannot be 
emancipated . So long as the state is Christian and the Jew is Jewish , the one 
is as incapable of granting emancipation as the other is of receiving it . The 
Christian state can behave towards the Jew only in the way character
 istic of the Christian state – that is , by granting privileges , by 
permitting the separation of the Jew from the other subjects , but making him 
feel the pressure of all the other separate spheres of society , and feel it 
all the more intensely because he is in religious opposition to the dominant 
religion . But the Jew , too , can behave towards the state only in a Jewish 
way – that is , by treating it as something alien to him , by counterposing 
his imaginary nationality to the real nationality , by counterposing his 
illusory law to the real law , by deeming himself justified in separating 
himself from mankind , by abstaining on principle from taking part in the 
historical movement , by putting his trust in a future which has nothing in 
common with the future of mankind in general , and by seeing himself as a 
member of the Jewish people , and the Jewish people as the chosen people . On 
what grounds , then , do you Jews want emancipation ? On account of your 
religion ? It is 
 the mortal enemy of the state religion . As citizens ? In Germany , there are 
no citizens . As human beings ? But you are no more human beings than those to 
whom you appeal . Bauer has posed the question of Jewish emancipation in a new 
form , after giving a critical analysis of the previous formulations and 
solutions of the question . What , he asks , is the nature of the Jew who is to 
be emancipated and of the Christian state that is to emancipate him ? He 
replies by a critique of the Jewish religion , he analyzes the religious 
opposition between Judaism and Christianity , he elucidates the essence of the 
Christian state – and he does all this audaciously , trenchantly , wittily , 
and with profundity , in a style of writing that is as precise as it is pithy 
and vigorous . How , then , does Bauer solve the Jewish question ? What is the 
result ? The formulation of a question is its solution . The critique of the 
Jewish question is the answer to the Jewish question . The summary , t
 herefore , is as follows : We must emancipate ourselves before we can 
emancipate others . The most rigid form of the opposition between the Jew and 
the Christian is the religious opposition . How is an opposition resolved ? By 
making it impossible . How is religious opposition made impossible ? By 
abolishing religion . As soon as Jew and Christian recognize that their 
respective religions are no more than different stages in the development of 
the human mind , different snake skins cast off by history , and that man is 
the snake who sloughed them , the relation of Jew and Christian is no longer 
religious but is only a critical , scientific , and human relation . Science , 
then , constitutes their unity . But , contradictions in science are resolved 
by science itself . The German Jew , in particular , is confronted by the 
general absence of political emancipation and the strongly marked Christian 
character of the state . In Bauer’s conception , however , the Jewish 
question has a u
 niversal significance , independent of specifically German conditions . It is 
the question of the relation of religion to the state , of the contradiction 
between religious constraint and political emancipation . Emancipation from 
religion is laid down as a condition , both to the Jew who wants to be 
emancipated politically , and to the state which is to effect emancipation and 
is itself to be emancipated . “ Very well , ” it is said , and the Jew 
himself says it , “ the Jew is to become emancipated not as a Jew , not 
because he is a Jew , not because he possesses such an excellent , universally 
human principle of morality ; on the contrary , the Jew will retreat behind the 
citizen and be a citizen , although he is a Jew and is to remain a Jew . That 
is to say , he is and remains a Jew , although he is a citizen and lives in 
universally human conditions : his Jewish and restricted nature triumphs always 
in the end over his human and political obligations . The prejudice remain
 s in spite of being outstripped by general principles . But if it remains , 
then , on the contrary , it outstrips everything else . ” “ Only 
sophistically , only apparently , would the Jew be able to remain a Jew in the 
life of the state . Hence , if he wanted to remain a Jew , the mere appearance 
would become the essential and would triumph ; that is to say , his life in the 
state would be only a semblance or only a temporary exception to the essential 
and the rule . ” ( “ The Capacity of Present-Day Jews and Christians to 
Become Free , ” Einundzwanzig Bogen , pp . 57 ) Let us hear , on the other 
hand , how Bauer presents the task of the state . “ France , ” he says , 
“ has recently shown us ” ( Proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies , 
December 26 , 1840 ) “ in the connection with the Jewish question – just as 
it has continually done in all other political questions – the spectacle of a 
life which is free , but which revokes its freedom by law , hence declar
 ing it to be an appearance , and on the other hand contradicting its free laws 
by its action . ” ( The Jewish Question , p. 64 ) “ In France , universal 
freedom is not yet the law , the Jewish question too has not yet been solved , 
because legal freedom – the fact that all citizens are equal – is 
restricted in actual life , which is still dominated and divided by religious 
privileges , and this lack of freedom in actual life reacts on law and compels 
the latter to sanction the division of the citizens , who as such are free , 
into oppressed and oppressors . ” ( p. 65 ) When , therefore , would the 
Jewish question be solved for France ? “ The Jew , for example , would have 
ceased to be a Jew if he did not allow himself to be prevented by his laws from 
fulfilling his duty to the state and his fellow citizens , that is , for 
example , if on the Sabbath he attended the Chamber of Deputies and took part 
in the official proceedings . Every religious privilege , and therefore a
 lso the monopoly of a privileged church , would have been abolished altogether 
, and if some or many persons , or even the overwhelming majority , still 
believed themselves bound to fulfil religious duties , this fulfilment ought to 
be left to them as a purely private matter . ” ( p. 65 ) “ There is no 
longer any religion when there is no longer any privileged religion . Take from 
religion its exclusive power and it will no longer exist . ” ( p. 66 ) “ 
Just as M. Martin du Nord saw the proposal to omit mention of Sunday in the law 
as a motion to declare that Christianity has ceased to exist , with equal 
reason ( and this reason is very well founded ) the declaration that the law of 
the Sabbath is no longer binding on the Jew would be a proclamation abolishing 
Judaism . ” ( p. 71 ) Bauer , therefore , demands , on the one hand , that 
the Jew should renounce Judaism , and that mankind in general should renounce 
religion , in order to achieve civic emancipation . On the other
  hand , he quite consistently regards the political abolition of religion as 
the abolition of religion as such . The state which presupposes religion is not 
yet a true , real state . “ Of course , the religious notion affords security 
to the state . But to what state ? To what kind of state ? ” ( p. 97 ) At 
this point , the one-sided formulation of the Jewish question becomes evident . 
It was by no means sufficient to investigate : Who is to emancipate ? Who is to 
be emancipated ? Criticism had to investigate a third point . It had to inquire 
: What kind of emancipation is in question ? What conditions follow from the 
very nature of the emancipation that is demanded ? Only the criticism of 
political emancipation itself would have been the conclusive criticism of the 
Jewish question and its real merging in the “ general question of time . ” 
Because Bauer does not raise the question to this level , he becomes entangled 
in contradictions . He puts forward conditions which are n
 ot based on the nature of political emancipation itself . He raises questions 
which are not part of his problem , and he solves problems which leave this 
question unanswered . When Bauer says of the opponents of Jewish emancipation : 
“ Their error was only that they assumed the Christian state to be the only 
true one and did not subject it to the same criticism that they applied to 
Judaism ” ( op . cit . , p. 3 ) , we find that his error lies in the fact 
that he subjects to criticism only the “ Christian state , ” not the “ 
state as such , ” that he does not investigate the relation of political 
emancipation to human emancipation and , therefore , puts forward conditions 
which can be explained only by uncritical confusion of political emancipation 
with general human emancipation . If Bauer asks the Jews : Have you , from your 
standpoint , the right to want political emancipation ? We ask the converse 
question : Does the standpoint of political emancipation give the right
  to demand from the Jew the abolition of Judaism and from man the abolition of 
religion ? The Jewish question acquires a different form depending on the state 
in which the Jew lives . In Germany , where there is no political state , no 
state as such , the Jewish question is a purely theological one . The Jew finds 
himself in religious opposition to the state , which recognizes Christianity as 
its basis . This state is a theologian ex professo . Criticism here is 
criticism of theology , a double-edged criticism – criticism of Christian 
theology and of Jewish theology . Hence , we continue to operate in the sphere 
of theology , however much we may operate critically within it . In France , a 
constitutional state , the Jewish question is a question of constitutionalism , 
the question of the incompleteness of political emancipation . Since the 
semblance of a state religion is retained here , although in a meaningless and 
self-contradictory formula , that of a religion of the majority 
 , the relation of the Jew to the state retains the semblance of a religious , 
theological opposition . Only in the North American states – at least , in 
some of them – does the Jewish question lose its theological significance and 
become a really secular question . Only where the political state exists in its 
completely developed form can the relation of the Jew , and of the religious 
man in general , to the political state , and therefore the relation of 
religion to the state , show itself in its specific character , in its purity . 
The criticism of this relation ceases to be theological criticism as soon as 
the state ceases to adopt a theological attitude toward religion , as soon as 
it behaves towards religion as a state – i. e. , politically . Criticism , 
then , becomes criticism of the political state . At this point , where the 
question ceases to be theological , Bauer’s criticism ceases to be critical . 
“ In the United States there is neither a state religion nor a 
 religion declared to be that of the majority , nor the predominance of one 
cult over another . The state stands aloof from all cults . ” ( Marie ou 
l’esclavage aux Etats-Unis , etc. , by G. de Beaumont , Paris , 1835 , p. 214 
) Indeed , there are some North American states where “ the constitution does 
not impose any religious belief or religious practice as a condition of 
political rights . ” ( op . cit . , p. 225 ) Nevertheless , “ in the United 
States people do not believe that a man without religion could be an honest man 
. ” ( op . cit . , p. 224 ) Nevertheless , North America is pre-eminently the 
country of religiosity , as Beaumont , Tocqueville , and the Englishman 
Hamilton unanimously assure us . The North American states , however , serve us 
only as an example . The question is : What is the relation of complete 
political emancipation to religion ? If we find that even in the country of 
complete political emancipation , religion not only exists , but displays a
  fresh and vigorous vitality , that is proof that the existence of religion is 
not in contradiction to the perfection of the state . Since , however , the 
existence of religion is the existence of defect , the source of this defect 
can only be sought in the nature of the state itself . We no longer regard 
religion as the cause , but only as the manifestation of secular narrowness . 
Therefore , we explain the religious limitations of the free citizen by their 
secular limitations . We do not assert that they must overcome their religious 
narrowness in order to get rid of their secular restrictions , we assert that 
they will overcome their religious narrowness once they get rid of their 
secular restrictions . We do not turn secular questions into theological ones . 
History has long enough been merged in superstition , we now merge superstition 
in history . The question of the relation of political emancipation to religion 
becomes for us the question of the relation of political emancip
 ation to human emancipation . We criticize the religious weakness of the 
political state by criticizing the political state in its secular form , apart 
from its weaknesses as regards religion . The contradiction between the state 
and a particular religion , for instance Judaism , is given by us a human form 
as the contradiction between the state and particular secular elements ; the 
contradiction between the state and religion in general as the contradiction 
between the state and its presuppositions in general . The political 
emancipation of the Jew , the Christian , and , in general , of religious man , 
is the emancipation of the state from Judaism , from Christianity , from 
religion in general . In its own form , in the manner characteristic of its 
nature , the state as a state emancipates itself from religion by emancipating 
itself from the state religion – that is to say , by the state as a state not 
professing any religion , but , on the contrary , asserting itself as a state
  . The political emancipation from religion is not a religious emancipation 
that has been carried through to completion and is free from contradiction , 
because political emancipation is not a form of human emancipation which has 
been carried through to completion and is free from contradiction . The limits 
of political emancipation are evident at once from the fact that the state can 
free itself from a restriction without man being really free from this 
restriction , that the state can be a free state [ pun on word Freistaat , 
which also means republic ] without man being a free man . Bauer himself 
tacitly admits this when he lays down the following condition for political 
emancipation : “ Every religious privilege , and therefore also the monopoly 
of a privileged church , would have been abolished altogether , and if some or 
many persons , or even the overwhelming majority , still believed themselves 
bound to fulfil religious duties , this fulfilment ought to be left to them as 
 a purely private matter . ” [ The Jewish Question , p. 65 ] It is possible , 
therefore , for the state to have emancipated itself from religion even if the 
overwhelming majority is still religious . And the overwhelming majority does 
not cease to be religious through being religious in private . But , the 
attitude of the state , and of the republic [ free state ] in particular , to 
religion is , after all , only the attitude to religion of the men who compose 
the state . It follows from this that man frees himself through the medium of 
the state , that he frees himself politically from a limitation when , in 
contradiction with himself , he raises himself above this limitation in an 
abstract , limited , and partial way . It follows further that , by freeing 
himself politically , man frees himself in a roundabout way , through an 
intermediary , although an essential intermediary . It follows , finally , that 
man , even if he proclaims himself an atheist through the medium of the sta
 te – that is , if he proclaims the state to be atheist – still remains in 
the grip of religion , precisely because he acknowledges himself only by a 
roundabout route , only through an intermediary . Religion is precisely the 
recognition of man in a roundabout way , through an intermediary . The state is 
the intermediary between man and man’s freedom . Just as Christ is the 
intermediary to whom man transfers the burden of all his divinity , all his 
religious constraint , so the state is the intermediary to whom man transfers 
all his non-divinity and all his human unconstraint . The political elevation 
of man above religion shares all the defects and all the advantages of 
political elevation in general . The state as a state annuls , for instance , 
private property , man declares by political means that private property is 
abolished as soon as the property qualification for the right to elect or be 
elected is abolished , as has occurred in many states of North America . 
Hamilton
  quite correctly interprets this fact from a political point of view as 
meaning : “ the masses have won a victory over the property owners and 
financial wealth . ” [ Thomas Hamilton , Men and Manners in America , 2 vols 
, Edinburgh , 1833 , p. 146 ] Is not private property abolished in idea if the 
non-property owner has become the legislator for the property owner ? The 
property qualification for the suffrage is the last political form of giving 
recognition to private property . Nevertheless , the political annulment of 
private property not only fails to abolish private property but even 
presupposes it . The state abolishes , in its own way , distinctions of birth , 
social rank , education , occupation , when it declares that birth , social 
rank , education , occupation , are non-political distinctions , when it 
proclaims , without regard to these distinction , that every member of the 
nation is an equal participant in national sovereignty , when it treats all 
elements of the re
 al life of the nation from the standpoint of the state . Nevertheless , the 
state allows private property , education , occupation , to act in their way 
– i. e. , as private property , as education , as occupation , and to exert 
the influence of their special nature . Far from abolishing these real 
distinctions , the state only exists on the presupposition of their existence ; 
it feels itself to be a political state and asserts its universality only in 
opposition to these elements of its being . Hegel , therefore , defines the 
relation of the political state to religion quite correctly when he says : “ 
In order [ ... ] that the state should come into existence as the self-knowing 
, moral reality of the mind , its distraction from the form of authority and 
faith is essential . But this distinction emerges only insofar as the 
ecclesiastical aspect arrives at a separation within itself . It is only in 
this way that the state , above the particular churches , has achieved and 
brough
 t into existence universality of thought , which is the principle of its form 
” ( Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , 1st edition , p. 346 ) . Of course ! Only 
in this way , above the particular elements , does the state constitute itself 
as universality . The perfect political state is , by its nature , man’s 
species-life , as opposed to his material life . All the preconditions of this 
egoistic life continue to exist in civil society outside the sphere of the 
state , but as qualities of civil society . Where the political state has 
attained its true development , man – not only in thought , in consciousness 
, but in reality , in life – leads a twofold life , a heavenly and an earthly 
life : life in the political community , in which he considers himself a 
communal being , and life in civil society , in which he acts as a private 
individual , regards other men as a means , degrades himself into a means , and 
becomes the plaything of alien powers . The relation of the political 
 state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relations of heaven to 
earth . The political state stands in the same opposition to civil society , 
and it prevails over the latter in the same way as religion prevails over the 
narrowness of the secular world – i. e. , by likewise having always to 
acknowledge it , to restore it , and allow itself to be dominated by it . In 
his most immediate reality , in civil society , man is a secular being . Here , 
where he regards himself as a real individual , and is so regarded by others , 
he is a fictitious phenomenon . In the state , on the other hand , where man is 
regarded as a species-being , he is the imaginary member of an illusory 
sovereignty , is deprived of his real individual life and endowed with an 
unreal universality . Man , as the adherent of a particular religion , finds 
himself in conflict with his citizenship and with other men as members of the 
community . This conflict reduces itself to the secular division between the p
 olitical state and civil society . For man as a bourgeois [ i. e. , as a 
member of civil society , “ bourgeois society ” in German ] , “ life in 
the state ” is “ only a semblance or a temporary exception to the essential 
and the rule . ” Of course , the bourgeois , like the Jew , remains only 
sophistically in the sphere of political life , just as the citoyen [ ‘ 
citizen ’ in French , i. e. , the participant in political life ] only 
sophistically remains a Jew or a bourgeois . But , this sophistry is not 
personal . It is the sophistry of the political state itself . The difference 
between the merchant and the citizen [ Staatsbürger ] , between the 
day-laborer and the citizen , between the landowner and the citizen , between 
the merchant and the citizen , between the living individual and the citizen . 
The contradiction in which the religious man finds himself with the political 
man is the same contradiction in which the bourgeois finds himself with the 
citoyen , and
  the member of civil society with his political lion’s skin . This secular 
conflict , to which the Jewish question ultimately reduces itself , the 
relation between the political state and its preconditions , whether these are 
material elements , such as private property , etc. , or spiritual elements , 
such as culture or religion , the conflict between the general interest and 
private interest , the schism between the political state and civil society – 
these secular antitheses Bauer allows to persist , whereas he conducts a 
polemic against their religious expression . “ It is precisely the basis of 
civil society , the need that ensures the continuance of this society and 
guarantees its necessity , which exposes its existence to continual dangers , 
maintains in it an element of uncertainty , and produces that continually 
changing mixture of poverty and riches , of distress and prosperity , and 
brings about change in general . ” ( p. 8 ) Compare the whole section : “ 
Civil 
 Society ” ( pp . 8-9 ) , which has been drawn up along the basic lines of 
Hegel’s philosophy of law . Civil society , in its opposition to the 
political state , is recognized as necessary , because the political state is 
recognized as necessary . Political emancipation is , of course , a big step 
forward . True , it is not the final form of human emancipation in general , 
but it is the final form of human emancipation within the hitherto existing 
world order . It goes without saying that we are speaking here of real , 
practical emancipation . Man emancipates himself politically from religion by 
banishing it from the sphere of public law to that of private law . Religion is 
no longer the spirit of the state , in which man behaves – although in a 
limited way , in a particular form , and in a particular sphere – as a 
species-being , in community with other men . Religion has become the spirit of 
civil society , of the sphere of egoism , of bellum omnium contra omnes . It is 
no 
 longer the essence of community , but the essence of difference . It has 
become the expression of man’s separation from his community , from himself 
and from other men – as it was originally . It is only the abstract avowal of 
specific perversity , private whimsy , and arbitrariness . The endless 
fragmentation of religion in North America , for example , gives it even 
externally the form of a purely individual affair . It has been thrust among 
the multitude of private interests and ejected from the community as such . But 
one should be under no illusion about the limits of political emancipation . 
The division of the human being into a public man and a private man , the 
displacement of religion from the state into civil society , this is not a 
stage of political emancipation but its completion ; this emancipation , 
therefore , neither abolished the real religiousness of man , nor strives to do 
so . The decomposition of man into Jew and citizen , Protestant and citizen , 
religiou
 s man and citizen , is neither a deception directed against citizenhood , nor 
is it a circumvention of political emancipation , it is political emancipation 
itself , the political method of emancipating oneself from religion . Of course 
, in periods when the political state as such is born violently out of civil 
society , when political liberation is the form in which men strive to achieve 
their liberation , the state can and must go as far as the abolition of 
religion , the destruction of religion . But it can do so only in the same way 
that it proceeds to the abolition of private property , to the maximum , to 
confiscation , to progressive taxation , just as it goes as far as the 
abolition of life , the guillotine . At times of special self-confidence , 
political life seeks to suppress its prerequisite , civil society and the 
elements composing this society , and to constitute itself as the real 
species-life of man , devoid of contradictions . But , it can achieve this only 
by com
 ing into violent contradiction with its own conditions of life , only by 
declaring the revolution to be permanent , and , therefore , the political 
drama necessarily ends with the re-establishment of religion , private property 
, and all elements of civil society , just as war ends with peace . Indeed , 
the perfect Christian state is not the so-called Christian state – which 
acknowledges Christianity as its basis , as the state religion , and , 
therefore , adopts an exclusive attitude towards other religions . On the 
contrary , the perfect Christian state is the atheistic state , the democratic 
state , the state which relegates religion to a place among the other elements 
of civil society . The state which is still theological , which still 
officially professes Christianity as its creed , which still does not dare to 
proclaim itself as a state , has , in its reality as a state , not yet 
succeeded in expressing the human basis – of which Christianity is the 
high-flown expression 
 – in a secular , human form . The so-called Christian state is simply 
nothing more than a non-state , since it is not Christianity as a religion , 
but only the human background of the Christian religion , which can find its 
expression in actual human creations . The so-called Christian state is the 
Christian negation of the state , but by no means the political realization of 
Christianity . The state which still professes Christianity in the form of 
religion , does not yet profess it in the form appropriate to the state , for 
it still has a religious attitude towards religion – that is to say , it is 
not the true implementation of the human basis of religion , because it still 
relies on the unreal , imaginary form of this human core . The so-called 
Christian state is the imperfect state , and the Christian religion is regarded 
by it as the supplementation and sanctification of its imperfection . For the 
Christian state , therefore , religion necessarily becomes a means ; hence ,
  it is a hypocritical state . It makes a great difference whether the complete 
state , because of the defect inherent in the general nature of the state , 
counts religion among its presuppositions , or whether the incomplete state , 
because of the defect inherent in its particular existence as a defective state 
, declares that religion is its basis . In the latter case , religion becomes 
imperfect politics . In the former case , the imperfection even of consummate 
politics becomes evident in religion . The so-called Christian state needs the 
Christian religion in order to complete itself as a state . The democratic 
state , the real state , does not need religion for its political completion . 
On the contrary , it can disregard religion because in it the human basis of 
religion is realized in a secular manner . The so-called Christian state , on 
the other hand , has a political attitude to religion and a religious attitude 
to politics . By degrading the forms of the state to mere sem
 blance , it equally degrades religion to mere semblance . In order to make 
this contradiction clearer , let us consider Bauer’s projection of the 
Christian state , a projection based on his observation of the Christian-German 
state . “ Recently , ” says Bauer , “ in order to prove the impossibility 
or non-existence of a Christian state , reference has frequently been made to 
those sayings in the Gospel with which the [ present-day ] state not only does 
not comply , but cannot possibly comply , if it does not want to dissolve 
itself completely [ as a state ] . ” “ But the matter cannot be disposed of 
so easily . What do these Gospel sayings demand ? Supernatural renunciation of 
self , submission to the authority of revelation , a turning-away from the 
state , the abolition of secular conditions . Well , the Christian state 
demands and accomplishes all that . It has assimilated the spirit of the Gospel 
, and if it does not reproduce this spirit in the same terms as the Gos
 pel , that occurs only because it expresses this spirit in political forms , 
i. e. , in forms which , it is true , are taken from the political system in 
this world , but which in the religious rebirth that they have to undergo 
become degraded to a mere semblance . This is a turning-away from the state 
while making use of political forms for its realization . ” ( p. 55 ) Bauer 
then explains that the people of a Christian state is only a non-people , no 
longer having a will of its own , but whose true existence lies in the leader 
to whom it is subjected , although this leader by his origin and nature is 
alien to it – i. e. , given by God and imposed on the people without any 
co-operation on its part . Bauer declares that the laws of such a people are 
not its own creation , but are actual revelations , that its supreme chief 
needs privileged intermediaries with the people in the strict sense , with the 
masses , and that the masses themselves are divided into a multitude of particu
 lar groupings which are formed and determined by chance , which are 
differentiated by their interests , their particular passions and prejudices , 
and obtain permission as a privilege , to isolate themselves from one another , 
etc. ( p. 56 ) However , Bauer himself says : “ Politics , if it is to be 
nothing but religion , ought not to be politics , just as the cleaning of 
saucepans , if it is to be accepted as a religious matter , ought not to be 
regarded as a matter of domestic economy . ” ( p. 108 ) In the 
Christian-German state , however , religion is an “ economic matter ” just 
as “ economic matters ” belong to the sphere of religion . The domination 
of religion in the Christian-German state is the religion of domination . The 
separation of the “ spirit of the Gospel ” from the “ letter of the 
Gospel ” is an irreligious act . A state which makes the Gospel speak in the 
language of politics – that is , in another language than that of the Holy 
Ghost – comm
 its sacrilege , if not in human eyes , then in the eyes of its own religion . 
The state which acknowledges Christianity as its supreme criterion , and the 
Bible as its Charter , must be confronted with the words of Holy Scripture , 
for every word of Scripture is holy . This state , as well as the human rubbish 
on which it is based , is caught in a painful contradiction that is insoluble 
from the standpoint of religious consciousness when it is referred to those 
sayings of the Gospel with which it “ not only does not comply , but cannot 
possibly comply , if it does not want to dissolve itself completely as a state 
. ” And why does it not want to dissolve itself completely ? The state itself 
cannot give an answer either to itself or to others . In its own consciousness 
, the official Christian state is an imperative , the realization of which is 
unattainable , the state can assert the reality of its existence only by lying 
to itself , and therefore always remains in its own eyes a
 n object of doubt , an unreliable , problematic object . Criticism is , 
therefore , fully justified in forcing the state that relies on the Bible into 
a mental derangement in which it no longer knows whether it is an illusion or a 
reality , and in which the infamy of its secular aims , for which religion 
serves as a cloak , comes into insoluble conflict with the sincerity of its 
religious consciousness , for which religion appears as the aim of the world . 
This state can only save itself from its inner torment if it becomes the police 
agent of the Catholic Church . In relation to the church , which declares the 
secular power to be its servant , the state is powerless , the secular power 
which claims to be the rule of the religious spirit is powerless . It is , 
indeed , estrangement which matters in the so-called Christian state , but not 
man . The only man who counts , the king , is a being specifically different 
from other men , and is , moreover , a religious being , directly link
 ed with heaven , with God . The relationships which prevail here are still 
relationships dependent of faith . The religious spirit , therefore , is still 
not really secularized . But , furthermore , the religious spirit cannot be 
really secularized , for what is it in itself but the non-secular form of a 
stage in the development of the human mind ? The religious spirit can only be 
secularized insofar as the stage of development of the human mind of which it 
is the religious expression makes its appearance and becomes constituted in its 
secular form . This takes place in the democratic state . Not Christianity , 
but the human basis of Christianity is the basis of this state . Religion 
remains the ideal , non-secular consciousness of its members , because religion 
is the ideal form of the stage of human development achieved in this state . 
The members of the political state are religious owing to the dualism between 
individual life and species-life , between the life of civil society 
 and political life . They are religious because men treat the political life 
of the state , an area beyond their real individuality , as if it were their 
true life . They are religious insofar as religion here is the spirit of civil 
society , expressing the separation and remoteness of man from man . Political 
democracy is Christian since in it man , not merely one man but everyman , 
ranks as sovereign , as the highest being , but it is man in his uncivilized , 
unsocial form , man in his fortuitous existence , man just as he is , man as he 
has been corrupted by the whole organization of our society , who has lost 
himself , been alienated , and handed over to the rule of inhuman conditions 
and elements – in short , man who is not yet a real species-being . That 
which is a creation of fantasy , a dream , a postulate of Christianity , i. e. 
, the sovereignty of man – but man as an alien being different from the real 
man – becomes , in democracy , tangible reality , present existe
 nce , and secular principle . In the perfect democracy , the religious and 
theological consciousness itself is in its own eyes the more religious and the 
more theological because it is apparently without political significance , 
without worldly aims , the concern of a disposition that shuns the world , the 
expression of intellectual narrow-mindedness , the product of arbitrariness and 
fantasy , and because it is a life that is really of the other world . 
Christianity attains , here , the practical expression of its 
universal-religious significance in that the most diverse world outlooks are 
grouped alongside one another in the form of Christianity and still more 
because it does not require other people to profess Christianity , but only 
religion in general , any kind of religion ( cf . Beaumont’s work quoted 
above ) . The religious consciousness revels in the wealth of religious 
contradictions and religious diversity . We have , thus , shown that political 
emancipation from religi
 on leaves religion in existence , although not a privileged religion . The 
contradiction in which the adherent of a particular religion finds himself 
involved in relation to his citizenship is only one aspect of the universal 
secular contradiction between the political state and civil society . The 
consummation of the Christian state is the state which acknowledges itself as a 
state and disregards the religion of its members . The emancipation of the 
state from religion is not the emancipation of the real man from religion . 
Therefore , we do not say to the Jews , as Bauer does : You cannot be 
emancipated politically without emancipating yourselves radically from Judaism 
. On the contrary , we tell them : Because you can be emancipated politically 
without renouncing Judaism completely and incontrovertibly , political 
emancipation itself is not human emancipation . If you Jews want to be 
emancipated politically , without emancipating yourselves humanly , the 
half-hearted approach and
  contradiction is not in you alone , it is inherent in the nature and category 
of political emancipation . If you find yourself within the confines of this 
category , you share in a general confinement . Just as the state evangelizes 
when , although it is a state , it adopts a Christian attitude towards the Jews 
, so the Jew acts politically when , although a Jew , he demands civic rights . 
But , if a man , although a Jew , can be emancipated politically and receive 
civic rights , can he lay claim to the so-called rights of man and receive them 
? Bauer denies it . “ The question is whether the Jew as such , that is , the 
Jew who himself admits that he is compelled by his true nature to live 
permanently in separation from other men , is capable of receiving the 
universal rights of man and of conceding them to others . ” “ For the 
Christian world , the idea of the rights of man was only discovered in the last 
century . It is not innate in men ; on the contrary , it is gained onl
 y in a struggle against the historical traditions in which hitherto man was 
brought up . Thus the rights of man are not a gift of nature , not a legacy 
from past history , but the reward of the struggle against the accident of 
birth and against the privileges which up to now have been handed down by 
history from generation to generation . These rights are the result of culture 
, and only one who has earned and deserved them can possess them . ” “ Can 
the Jew really take possession of them ? As long as he is a Jew , the 
restricted nature which makes him a Jew is bound to triumph over the human 
nature which should link him as a man with other men , and will separate him 
from non-Jews . He declares by this separation that the particular nature which 
makes him a Jew is his true , highest nature , before which human nature has to 
give way . ” “ Similarly , the Christian as a Christian cannot grant the 
rights of man . ” ( p. 19-20 ) According to Bauer , man has to sacrifice the 
 “ privilege of faith ” to be able to receive the universal rights of man . 
Let us examine , for a moment , the so-called rights of man – to be precise , 
the rights of man in their authentic form , in the form which they have among 
those who discovered them , the North Americans and the French . These rights 
of man are , in part , political rights , rights which can only be exercised in 
community with others . Their content is participation in the community , and 
specifically in the political community , in the life of the state . They come 
within the category of political freedom , the category of civic rights , which 
, as we have seen , in no way presuppose the incontrovertible and positive 
abolition of religion – nor , therefore , of Judaism . There remains to be 
examined the other part of the rights of man – the droits d’homme , insofar 
as these differ from the droits d’citoyen . Included among them is freedom of 
conscience , the right to practice any religion one c
 hooses . The privilege of faith is expressly recognized either as a right of 
man or as the consequence of a right of man , that of liberty . Déclaration 
des droits de l’droits et du citoyen , 1791 , Article 10 : “ No one is to 
be subjected to annoyance because of his opinions , even religious opinions . 
” “ The freedom of every man to practice the religion of which he is an 
adherent . ” Declaration of the Rights of Man , etc. , 1793 , includes among 
the rights of man , Article 7 : “ The free exercise of religion . ” Indeed 
, in regard to man’s right to express his thoughts and opinions , to hold 
meetings , and to exercise his religion , it is even stated : “ The necessity 
of proclaiming these rights presupposes either the existence or the recent 
memory of despotism . ” Compare the Constitution of 1795 , Section XIV , 
Article 354. Constitution of Pennsylvania , Article 9 , § 3 : “ All men have 
received from nature the imprescriptible right to worship the Almig
 hty according to the dictates of their conscience , and no one can be legally 
compelled to follow , establish , or support against his will any religion or 
religious ministry . No human authority can , in any circumstances , intervene 
in a matter of conscience or control the forces of the soul . ” Constitution 
of New Hampshire , Article 5 and 6 : “ Among these natural rights some are by 
nature inalienable since nothing can replace them . The rights of conscience 
are among them . ” ( Beaumont , op . cit . , pp . 213,214 ) Incompatibility 
between religion and the rights of man is to such a degree absent from the 
concept of the rights of man that , on the contrary , a man’s right to be 
religious , in any way he chooses , to practise his own particular religion , 
is expressly included among the rights of man . The privilege of faith is a 
universal right of man . The droits de l’homme , the rights of man , are , as 
such , distinct from the droits du citoyen , the rights of the 
 citizen . Who is homme as distinct from citoyen ? None other than the member 
of civil society . Why is the member of civil society called “ man , ” 
simply man ; why are his rights called the rights of man ? How is this fact to 
be explained ? From the relationship between the political state and civil 
society , from the nature of political emancipation . Above all , we note the 
fact that the so-called rights of man , the droits de l’homme as distinct 
from the droits du citoyen , are nothing but the rights of a member of civil 
society – i. e. , the rights of egoistic man , of man separated from other 
men and from the community . Let us hear what the most radical Constitution , 
the Constitution of 1793 , has to say : Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen . Article 2. “ These rights , etc. , ( the natural and 
imprescriptible rights ) are : equality , liberty , security , property . ” 
What constitutes liberty ? Article 6. “ Liberty is the power which man has t
 o do everything that does not harm the rights of others , ” or , according 
to the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1791 : “ Liberty consists in being 
able to do everything which does not harm others . ” Liberty , therefore , is 
the right to do everything that harms no one else . The limits within which 
anyone can act without harming someone else are defined by law , just as the 
boundary between two fields is determined by a boundary post . It is a question 
of the liberty of man as an isolated monad , withdrawn into himself . Why is 
the Jew , according to Bauer , incapable of acquiring the rights of man ? “ 
As long as he is a Jew , the restricted nature which makes him a Jew is bound 
to triumph over the human nature which should link him as a man with other men 
, and will separate him from non-Jews . ” But , the right of man to liberty 
is based not on the association of man with man , but on the separation of man 
from man . It is the right of this separation , the right 
 of the restricted individual , withdrawn into himself . The practical 
application of man’s right to liberty is man’s right to private property . 
What constitutes man’s right to private property ? Article 16. ( Constitution 
of 1793 ) : “ The right of property is that which every citizen has of 
enjoying and of disposing at his discretion of his goods and income , of the 
fruits of his labor and industry . ” The right of man to private property is 
, therefore , the right to enjoy one’s property and to dispose of it at 
one’s discretion ( à son gré ) , without regard to other men , 
independently of society , the right of self-interest . This individual liberty 
and its application form the basis of civil society . It makes every man see in 
other men not the realization of his own freedom , but the barrier to it . But 
, above all , it proclaims the right of man “ of enjoying and of disposing at 
his discretion of his goods and income , of the fruits of his labor and industr
 y . ” There remain the other rights of man : égalité and sûreté . 
Equality , used here in its non-political sense , is nothing but the equality 
of the liberté described above – namely : each man is to the same extent 
regarded as such a self-sufficient monad . The Constitution of 1795 defines the 
concept of this equality , in accordance with this significance , as follows : 
Article 3 ( Constitution of 1795 ) : “ Equality consists in the law being the 
same for all , whether it protects or punishes . ” And security ? Article 8 ( 
Constitution of 1793 ) : “ Security consists in the protection afforded by 
society to each of its members for the preservation of his person , his rights 
, and his property . ” Security is the highest social concept of civil 
society , the concept of police , expressing the fact that the whole of society 
exists only in order to guarantee to each of its members the preservation of 
his person , his rights , and his property . It is in this sense t
 hat Hegel calls civil society “ the state of need and reason . ” The 
concept of security does not raise civil society above its egoism . On the 
contrary , security is the insurance of egoism . None of the so-called rights 
of man , therefore , go beyond egoistic man , beyond man as a member of civil 
society – that is , an individual withdrawn into himself , into the confines 
of his private interests and private caprice , and separated from the community 
. In the rights of man , he is far from being conceived as a species-being ; on 
the contrary , species-like itself , society , appears as a framework external 
to the individuals , as a restriction of their original independence . The sole 
bond holding them together is natural necessity , need and private interest , 
the preservation of their property and their egoistic selves . It is puzzling 
enough that a people which is just beginning to liberate itself , to tear down 
all the barriers between its various sections , and to estab
 lish a political community , that such a people solemnly proclaims ( 
Declaration of 1791 ) the rights of egoistic man separated from his fellow men 
and from the community , and that indeed it repeats this proclamation at a 
moment when only the most heroic devotion can save the nation , and is 
therefore imperatively called for , at a moment when the sacrifice of all the 
interest of civil society must be the order of the day , and egoism must be 
punished as a crime . ( Declaration of the Rights of Man , etc. , of 1793 ) 
This fact becomes still more puzzling when we see that the political 
emancipators go so far as to reduce citizenship , and the political community , 
to a mere means for maintaining these so-called rights of man , that , 
therefore , the citoyen is declared to be the servant of egotistic homme , that 
the sphere in which man acts as a communal being is degraded to a level below 
the sphere in which he acts as a partial being , and that , finally , it is not 
man as citoyen 
 , but man as private individual [ bourgeois ] who is considered to be the 
essential and true man . “ The aim of all political association is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man . ” ( 
Declaration of the Rights , etc. , of 1791 , Article 2 ) “ Government is 
instituted in order to guarantee man the enjoyment of his natural and 
imprescriptible rights . ” ( Declaration , etc. , of 1793 , Article 1 ) Hence 
, even in moments when its enthusiasm still has the freshness of youth and is 
intensified to an extreme degree by the force of circumstances , political life 
declares itself to be a mere means , whose purpose is the life of civil society 
. It is true that its revolutionary practice is in flagrant contradiction with 
its theory . Whereas , for example , security is declared one of the rights of 
man , violation of the privacy of correspondence is openly declared to be the 
order of the day . Whereas “ unlimited freedom of the press ” ( 
Constitution 
 of 1793 , Article 122 ) is guaranteed as a consequence of the right of man to 
individual liberty , freedom of the press is totally destroyed , because “ 
freedom of the press should not be permitted when it endangers public liberty . 
” ( “ Robespierre jeune , ” Historie parlementaire de la Révolution 
française by Buchez and Roux , vol.28 , p. 159 ) That is to say , therefore : 
The right of man to liberty ceases to be a right as soon as it comes into 
conflict with political life , whereas in theory political life is only the 
guarantee of human rights , the rights of the individual , and therefore must 
be abandoned as soon as it comes into contradiction with its aim , with these 
rights of man . But , practice is merely the exception , theory is the rule . 
But even if one were to regard revolutionary practice as the correct 
presentation of the relationship , there would still remain the puzzle of why 
the relationship is turned upside-down in the minds of the political emancipa
 tors and the aim appears as the means , while the means appears as the aim . 
This optical illusion of their consciousness would still remain a puzzle , 
although now a psychological , a theoretical puzzle . The puzzle is easily 
solved . Political emancipation is , at the same time , the dissolution of the 
old society on which the state alienated from the people , the sovereign power 
, is based . What was the character of the old society ? It can be described in 
one word – feudalism . The character of the old civil society was directly 
political – that is to say , the elements of civil life , for example , 
property , or the family , or the mode of labor , were raised to the level of 
elements of political life in the form of seigniory , estates , and 
corporations . In this form , they determined the relation of the individual to 
the state as a whole – i. e. , his political relation , that is , his 
relation of separation and exclusion from the other components of society . For 
tha
 t organization of national life did not raise property or labor to the level 
of social elements ; on the contrary , it completed their separation from the 
state as a whole and constituted them as discrete societies within society . 
Thus , the vital functions and conditions of life of civil society remained , 
nevertheless , political , although political in the feudal sense – that is 
to say , they secluded the individual from the state as a whole and they 
converted the particular relation of his corporation to the state as a whole 
into his general relation to the life of the nation , just as they converted 
his particular civil activity and situation into his general activity and 
situation . As a result of this organization , the unity of the state , and 
also the consciousness , will , and activity of this unity , the general power 
of the state , are likewise bound to appear as the particular affair of a ruler 
and of his servants , isolated from the people . The political revolution
  which overthrew this sovereign power and raised state affairs to become 
affairs of the people , which constituted the political state as a matter of 
general concern , that is , as a real state , necessarily smashed all estates , 
corporations , guilds , and privileges , since they were all manifestations of 
the separation of the people from the community . The political revolution 
thereby abolished the political character of civil society . It broke up civil 
society into its simple component parts ; on the one hand , the individuals ; 
on the other hand , the material and spiritual elements constituting the 
content of the life and social position of these individuals . It set free the 
political spirit , which had been , as it were , split up , partitioned , and 
dispersed in the various blind alleys of feudal society . It gathered the 
dispersed parts of the political spirit , freed it from its intermixture with 
civil life , and established it as the sphere of the community , the gener
 al concern of the nation , ideally independent of those particular elements of 
civil life . A person’s distinct activity and distinct situation in life were 
reduced to a merely individual significance . They no longer constituted the 
general relation of the individual to the state as a whole . Public affairs as 
such , on the other hand , became the general affair of each individual , and 
the political function became the individual’s general function . But , the 
completion of the idealism of the state was at the same time the completion of 
the materialism of civil society . Throwing off the political yoke meant at the 
same time throwing off the bonds which restrained the egoistic spirit of civil 
society . Political emancipation was , at the same time , the emancipation of 
civil society from politics , from having even the semblance of a universal 
content . Feudal society was resolved into its basic element – man , but man 
as he really formed its basis – egoistic man . This m
 an , the member of civil society , is thus the basis , the precondition , of 
the political state . He is recognized as such by this state in the rights of 
man . The liberty of egoistic man and the recognition of this liberty , however 
, is rather the recognition of the unrestrained movement of the spiritual and 
material elements which form the content of his life . Hence , man was not 
freed from religion , he received religious freedom . He was not freed from 
property , he received freedom to own property . He was not freed from the 
egoism of business , he received freedom to engage in business . The 
establishment of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into 
independent individuals – whose relation with one another on law , just as 
the relations of men in the system of estates and guilds depended on privilege 
– is accomplished by one and the same act . Man as a member of civil society 
, unpolitical man , inevitably appears , however , as the natural man . The
  “ rights of man ” appears as “ natural rights , ” because conscious 
activity is concentrated on the political act . Egoistic man is the passive 
result of the dissolved society , a result that is simply found in existence , 
an object of immediate certainty , therefore a natural object . The political 
revolution resolves civil life into its component parts , without 
revolutionizing these components themselves or subjecting them to criticism . 
It regards civil society , the world of needs , labor , private interests , 
civil law , as the basis of its existence , as a precondition not requiring 
further substantiation and therefore as its natural basis . Finally , man as a 
member of civil society is held to be man in his sensuous , individual , 
immediate existence , whereas political man is only abstract , artificial man , 
man as an allegorical , juridical person . The real man is recognized only in 
the shape of the egoistic individual , the true man is recognized only in the 
sha
 pe of the abstract citizen . Therefore , Rousseau correctly described the 
abstract idea of political man as follows : “ Whoever dares undertake to 
establish a people’s institutions must feel himself capable of changing , as 
it were , human nature , of transforming each individual , who by himself is a 
complete and solitary whole , into a part of a larger whole , from which , in a 
sense , the individual receives his life and his being , of substituting a 
limited and mental existence for the physical and independent existence . He 
has to take from man his own powers , and give him in exchange alien powers 
which he cannot employ without the help of other men . ” All emancipation is 
a reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself . Political 
emancipation is the reduction of man , on the one hand , to a member of civil 
society , to an egoistic , independent individual , and , on the other hand , 
to a citizen , a juridical person . Only when the real , individual man
  re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen , and as an individual human being 
has become a species-being in his everyday life , in his particular work , and 
in his particular situation , only when man has recognized and organized his 
“ own powers ” as social powers , and , consequently , no longer separates 
social power from himself in the shape of political power , only then will 
human emancipation have been accomplished . II Bruno Bauer , “ The Capacity 
of Present-day Jews and Christians to Become Free , ” Einundzwanzig Bogen aus 
der Schweiz , pp . 56-71 It is in this form that Bauer deals with the relation 
between the Jewish and the Christian religions , and also with their relation 
to criticism . Their relation to criticism is their relation “ to the 
capacity to become free . ” The result arrived at is : “ The Christian has 
to surmount only one stage , namely , that of his religion , in order to give 
up religion altogether , ” and therefore become free . “ The
  Jew , on the other hand , has to break not only with his Jewish nature , but 
also with the development towards perfecting his religion , a development which 
has remained alien to him . ” ( p. 71 ) Thus , Bauer here transforms the 
question of Jewish emancipation into a purely religious question . The 
theological problem as to whether the Jew or the Christian has the better 
prospect of salvation is repeated here in the enlightened form : which of them 
is more capable of emancipation . No longer is the question asked : Is it 
Judaism or Christianity that makes a man free ? On the contrary , the question 
is now : Which makes man freer , the negation of Judaism or the negation of 
Christianity ? “ If the Jews want to become free , they should profess belief 
not in Christianity , but in the dissolution of Christianity , in the 
dissolution of religion in general , that is to say , in enlightenment , 
criticism , and its consequences , free humanity . ” ( p. 70 ) For the Jew , 
it is sti
 ll a matter of a profession of faith , but no longer a profession of belief in 
Christianity , but of belief in Christianity in dissolution . Bauer demands of 
the Jews that they should break with the essence of the Christian religion , a 
demand which , as he says himself , does not arise out of the development of 
Judaism . Since Bauer , at the end of his work on the Jewish question , had 
conceived Judaism only as crude religious criticism of Christianity , and 
therefore saw in it “ merely ” a religious significance , it could be 
foreseen that the emancipation of the Jews , too , would be transformed into a 
philosophical-theological act . Bauer considers that the ideal , abstract 
nature of the Jew , his religion , is his entire nature . Hence , he rightly 
concludes : “ The Jew contributes nothing to mankind if he himself disregards 
his narrow law , ” if he invalidates his entire Judaism . ( p. 65 ) 
Accordingly , the relation between Jews and Christians becomes the following : 
 the sole interest of the Christian in the emancipation of the Jew is a general 
human interest , a theoretical interest . Judaism is a fact that offends the 
religious eye of the Christian . As soon as his eye ceases to be religious , 
this fact ceases to be offensive . The emancipation of the Jew is , in itself , 
not a task for the Christian . The Jew , on the other hand , in order to 
emancipate himself , has to carry out not only his own work , but also that of 
the Christian – i. e. , the Critique of the Evangelical History of the 
Synoptics and the Life of Jesus , etc. “ It is up to them to deal with it : 
they themselves will decide their fate ; but history is not to be trifled with 
. ” ( p. 71 ) We are trying to break with the theological formulation of the 
question . For us , the question of the Jew’s capacity for emancipation 
becomes the question : What particular social element has to be overcome in 
order to abolish Judaism ? For the present-day Jew’s capacity for emanc
 ipation is the relation of Judaism to the emancipation of the modern world . 
This relation necessarily results from the special position of Judaism in the 
contemporary enslaved world . Let us consider the actual , worldly Jew – not 
the Sabbath Jew , as Bauer does , but the everyday Jew . Let us not look for 
the secret of the Jew in his religion , but let us look for the secret of his 
religion in the real Jew . What is the secular basis of Judaism ? Practical 
need , self-interest . What is the worldly religion of the Jew ? Huckstering . 
What is his worldly God ? Money . Very well then ! Emancipation from 
huckstering and money , consequently from practical , real Judaism , would be 
the self-emancipation of our time . An organization of society which would 
abolish the preconditions for huckstering , and therefore the possibility of 
huckstering , would make the Jew impossible . His religious consciousness would 
be dissipated like a thin haze in the real , vital air of society . On the
  other hand , if the Jew recognizes that this practical nature of his is 
futile and works to abolish it , he extricates himself from his previous 
development and works for human emancipation as such and turns against the 
supreme practical expression of human self-estrangement . We recognize in 
Judaism , therefore , a general anti-social element of the present time , an 
element which through historical development – to which in this harmful 
respect the Jews have zealously contributed – has been brought to its present 
high level , at which it must necessarily begin to disintegrate . In the final 
analysis , the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from 
Judaism . The Jew has already emancipated himself in a Jewish way . “ The Jew 
, who in Vienna , for example , is only tolerated , determines the fate of the 
whole Empire by his financial power . The Jew , who may have no rights in the 
smallest German state , decides the fate of Europe . While corporations and gui
 lds refuse to admit Jews , or have not yet adopted a favorable attitude 
towards them , the audacity of industry mocks at the obstinacy of the material 
institutions . ” ( Bruno Bauer , The Jewish Question , p. 114 ) This is no 
isolated fact . The Jew has emancipated himself in a Jewish manner , not only 
because he has acquired financial power , but also because , through him and 
also apart from him , money has become a world power and the practical Jewish 
spirit has become the practical spirit of the Christian nations . The Jews have 
emancipated themselves insofar as the Christians have become Jews . Captain 
Hamilton , for example , reports : “ The devout and politically free 
inhabitant of New England is a kind of Laocoön who makes not the least effort 
to escape from the serpents which are crushing him . Mammon is his idol which 
he adores not only with his lips but with the whole force of his body and mind 
. In his view the world is no more than a Stock Exchange , and he is conv
 inced that he has no other destiny here below than to become richer than his 
neighbor . Trade has seized upon all his thoughts , and he has no other 
recreation than to exchange objects . When he travels he carries , so to speak 
, his goods and his counter on his back and talks only of interest and profit . 
If he loses sight of his own business for an instant it is only in order to pry 
into the business of his competitors . ” Indeed , in North America , the 
practical domination of Judaism over the Christian world has achieved as its 
unambiguous and normal expression that the preaching of the Gospel itself and 
the Christian ministry have become articles of trade , and the bankrupt trader 
deals in the Gospel just as the Gospel preacher who has become rich goes in for 
business deals . “ The man who you see at the head of a respectable 
congregation began as a trader ; his business having failed , he became a 
minister . The other began as a priest but as soon as he had some money at h
 is disposal he left the pulpit to become a trader . In the eyes of very many 
people , the religious ministry is a veritable business career . ” ( Beaumont 
, op . cit . , pp . 185,186 ) According to Bauer , it is “ a fictitious state 
of affairs when in theory the Jew is deprived of political rights , whereas in 
practice he has immense power and exerts his political influence en gros , 
although it is curtailed en détail . ” ( Die Judenfrage , p. 114 ) The 
contradiction that exists between the practical political power of the Jew and 
his political rights is the contradiction between politics and the power of 
money in general . Although theoretically the former is superior to the latter 
, in actual fact politics has become the serf of financial power . Judaism has 
held its own alongside Christianity , not only as religious criticism of 
Christianity , not only as the embodiment of doubt in the religious derivation 
of Christianity , but equally because the practical Jewish spirit ,
  Judaism , has maintained itself and even attained its highest development in 
Christian society . The Jew , who exists as a distinct member of civil society 
, is only a particular manifestation of the Judaism of civil society . Judaism 
continues to exist not in spite of history , but owing to history . The Jew is 
perpetually created by civil society from its own entrails . What , in itself , 
was the basis of the Jewish religion ? Practical need , egoism . The monotheism 
of the Jew , therefore , is in reality the polytheism of the many needs , a 
polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of divine law . Practical 
need , egoism , is the principle of civil society , and as such appears in pure 
form as soon as civil society has fully given birth to the political state . 
The god of practical need and self-interest is money . Money is the jealous god 
of Israel , in face of which no other god may exist . Money degrades all the 
gods of man – and turns them into commodities . Money
  is the universal self-established value of all things . It has , therefore , 
robbed the whole world – both the world of men and nature – of its specific 
value . Money is the estranged essence of man’s work and man’s existence , 
and this alien essence dominates him , and he worships it . The god of the Jews 
has become secularized and has become the god of the world . The bill of 
exchange is the real god of the Jew . His god is only an illusory bill of 
exchange . The view of nature attained under the domination of private property 
and money is a real contempt for , and practical debasement of , nature ; in 
the Jewish religion , nature exists , it is true , but it exists only in 
imagination . It is in this sense that [ in a 1524 pamphlet ] Thomas Münzer 
declares it intolerable “ that all creatures have been turned into property , 
the fishes in the water , the birds in the air , the plants on the earth ; the 
creatures , too , must become free . ” Contempt for theory , art 
 , history , and for man as an end in himself , which is contained in an 
abstract form in the Jewish religion , is the real , conscious standpoint , the 
virtue of the man of money . The species-relation itself , the relation between 
man and woman , etc. , becomes an object of trade ! The woman is bought and 
sold . The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the merchant 
, of the man of money in general . The groundless law of the Jew is only a 
religious caricature of groundless morality and right in general , of the 
purely formal rites with which the world of self-interest surrounds itself . 
Here , too , man’s supreme relation is the legal one , his relation to laws 
that are valid for him not because they are laws of his own will and nature , 
but because they are the dominant laws and because departure from them is 
avenged . Jewish Jesuitism , the same practical Jesuitism which Bauer discovers 
in the Talmud , is the relation of the world of self-interest to the laws
  governing that world , the chief art of which consists in the cunning 
circumvention of these laws . Indeed , the movement of this world within its 
framework of laws is bound to be a continual suspension of law . Judaism could 
not develop further as a religion , could not develop further theoretically , 
because the world outlook of practical need is essentially limited and is 
completed in a few strokes . By its very nature , the religion of practical 
need could find its consummation not in theory , but only in practice , 
precisely because its truth is practice . Judaism could not create a new world 
; it could only draw the new creations and conditions of the world into the 
sphere of its activity , because practical need , the rationale of which is 
self-interest , is passive and does not expand at will , but finds itself 
enlarged as a result of the continuous development of social conditions . 
Judaism reaches its highest point with the perfection of civil society , but it 
is only in 
 the Christian world that civil society attains perfection . Only under the 
dominance of Christianity , which makes all national , natural , moral , and 
theoretical conditions extrinsic to man , could civil society separate itself 
completely from the life of the state , sever all the species-ties of man , put 
egoism and selfish need in the place of these species-ties , and dissolve the 
human world into a world of atomistic individuals who are inimically opposed to 
one another . Christianity sprang from Judaism . It has merged again in Judaism 
. From the outset , the Christian was the theorizing Jew , the Jew is , 
therefore , the practical Christian , and the practical Christian has become a 
Jew again . Christianity had only in semblance overcome real Judaism . It was 
too noble-minded , too spiritualistic to eliminate the crudity of practical 
need in any other way than by elevation to the skies . Christianity is the 
sublime thought of Judaism , Judaism is the common practical applicat
 ion of Christianity , but this application could only become general after 
Christianity as a developed religion had completed theoretically the 
estrangement of man from himself and from nature . Only then could Judaism 
achieve universal dominance and make alienated man and alienated nature into 
alienable , vendible objects subjected to the slavery of egoistic need and to 
trading . Selling [ Veräußerung ] is the practical aspect of alienation [ 
Entäußerung ] . Just as man , as long as he is in the grip of religion , is 
able to objectify his essential nature only by turning it into something alien 
, something fantastic , so under the domination of egoistic need he can be 
active practically , and produce objects in practice , only by putting his 
products , and his activity , under the domination of an alien being , and 
bestowing the significance of an alien entity – money – on them . In its 
perfected practice , Christian egoism of heavenly bliss is necessarily 
transformed into 
 the corporal egoism of the Jew , heavenly need is turned into world need , 
subjectivism into self-interest . We explain the tenacity of the Jew not by his 
religion , but , on the contrary , by the human basis of his religion – 
practical need , egoism . Since in civil society the real nature of the Jew has 
been universally realized and secularized , civil society could not convince 
the Jew of the unreality of his religious nature , which is indeed only the 
ideal aspect of practical need . Consequently , not only in the Pentateuch and 
the Talmud , but in present-day society we find the nature of the modern Jew , 
and not as an abstract nature but as one that is in the highest degree 
empirical , not merely as a narrowness of the Jew , but as the Jewish 
narrowness of society . Once society has succeeded in abolishing the empirical 
essence of Judaism – huckstering and its preconditions – the Jew will have 
become impossible , because his consciousness no longer has an object , becaus
 e the subjective basis of Judaism , practical need , has been humanized , and 
because the conflict between man’s individual-sensuous existence and his 
species-existence has been abolished . The social emancipation of the Jew is 
the emancipation of society from Judaism . 
\ No newline at end of file

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+The Maghreb’s Modern Islamists Moha Ennaji 2012-02-16 FEZ – Just over a 
year ago , the Arab Spring sparked dramatic change throughout the Arab world . 
Popular movements have brought a range of avowedly Islamist political parties 
to power , replacing the largely secular former regimes . What that will mean 
for these countries , and for the region , is one of today’s central 
geopolitical questions . In North Africa , two Islamist parties have come fully 
to power via democratic elections : al-Nahda ( Renaissance ) in Tunisia , where 
the Arab Spring began , and the Justice and Development Party ( PJD ) in 
Morocco , both of which now lead new coalition governments . Whereas a popular 
revolution produced regime change in Tunisia , Morocco underwent a peaceful 
transformation that left the monarchy in place . Last July , Moroccans voted 
overwhelmingly to approve a new constitution that shifts executive power from 
the king to the prime minister , who will now be fully responsible for t
 he cabinet , the civil service , and the implementation of government policies 
. The king retains some prerogatives , such as the authority to select the 
prime minister ( from the parliament’s majority party ) and the head of the 
army . Furthermore , like heads of state in other parliamentary systems , he 
has the right to appoint the government ministers and ambassadors , dissolve 
the parliament , and dismiss the cabinet . While the PJD’s success was based 
on institution-building within a constitutional monarchy , al-Nahda has 
revolutionized the Tunisian system . But both parties won after running on a 
moderate platform of constitutionalism , separation of powers , civil liberties 
, and women’s rights . This new political reality in the Maghreb will bring 
Europe – particularly France , the region’s old colonial master – 
face-to-face with Islamist governments determined to promote a new type of 
relationship . But these governments have much work to do at home first . Curr
 ently , the Maghreb countries suffer from soaring unemployment , poverty , and 
high prices for basic commodities . In response , both al-Nahda and the PJD are 
emphasizing job creation , free trade , foreign investment , and a crackdown on 
the corruption that has plagued their countries ’ economies . These 
governments ’ first major test of economic stewardship will be how they treat 
the tourism industry . Although Western tourism is a critically important 
source of employment and foreign currency in both countries , some Muslims have 
criticized the industry for promoting alcohol and other relaxed social 
conventions that threaten Islamic values . So far , both al-Nahda and the PJD 
have taken a pragmatic stance . They recognize that , while their supporters 
may be devout Muslims , they also need to earn a living ; empty hotels and 
beaches would be economically disastrous . Thus , tourism professionals in both 
countries have received strong government assurances that business will c
 ontinue as usual . Some European analysts predict that , over the longer term 
, greater stability will follow the political changes in the Maghreb , with 
perhaps more than a million unemployed Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants 
returning home if their countries ’ economies improve . That remains very 
much an open question . Islamist parties will now have enormous influence on 
economic policy , after decades of official separation of mosque and state . 
Islamic banking , for example , may soon be introduced , though some local and 
foreign investors argue that sharia regulations could drive away much-needed 
foreign investment . There are also concerns about inexperienced Islamist 
officials ’ ability to run finance ministries . But the region’s Islamist 
parties appear to be conscious of these risks , and determined to mitigate them 
. They know that they need economic growth to curb unemployment and pay for 
social services , so they are working to bolster the private sector . In many
  cases , they are even advocating the kind of free-market policies that their 
secular predecessors favored . Those policies should include trade 
liberalization . Until now , less than 2 % of the Maghreb countries ’ foreign 
trade has remained within the region . If the region’s new leaders can 
integrate their economies , a market of more than 75 million consumers would 
attract more foreign investment and trade with the rest of the world . Before 
an economically unified Maghreb can be realized , however , inter-state 
conflicts such as the Algerian-Moroccan dispute over the “ Western ” Sahara 
must be resolved . Otherwise , it will be difficult even to conceive a common 
future – without which the economic grievances that fueled the Maghreb’s 
revolutions are likely to continue . Much like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
, al-Nahda and the PJD will have to marginalize Islamic extremists in their 
movements , such as the Salafis , and adopt a pragmatic approach . To succeed 
econ
 omically , they will need Western support – and the West will not be eager 
to fund radical Islamist governments . As they negotiate the realities of 
modern economic life , the Maghreb’s Islamist ruling parties are likely to 
lose some supporters . But , unless they are willing to break with the past , 
they will not succeed in the present . 
\ No newline at end of file