I know this is well-worn ground, but I'd be grateful for some elaboration, from Ann or others, on what distinguishes those stereotypes upon which the state may not rely from those generalizations upon which states and courts may -- indeed, must -- rely in order to carry out any inquiry into the closeness of fit between means and ends.  And is the critical constitutional line thought to run between stereotype (bad) and generality (okay) or between "stereotypes like this" (bad) and "stereotypes of some other sort" (okay)? 

I'm not disagreeing with Ann's claim below, just wondering whether the line is something more than "we know the difference when we see it."

Mitch


At 05:01 PM 7/15/2003 -0500, you wrote:
"....the empirical sense that girls are more likely to be reluctant participants than boys, and thus more likely to be emotionally hurt by relationships gone bad (as relationships often do) -- does appear greater than the danger to boys....."


I don't see how, after U.S. v. Virginia and the recent Nevada v. Hibbs, a court can rely on a stereotype like this, no matter how accurate it is as a generality.

Ann

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