Re: "Agenda" and persecution of Mormons

[Robert Justin Lipkin]

In a message dated 7/16/2003 3:50:10 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

However, for a member of the LDS faith at that time, it
would have been more akin to a judicial review (or in this case, a
"revelation review") of an existing law than a change in the underlying
foundation of belief. 

       This is an effective connection to constitutional law. Can we say that the change from Bowers to Lawrence  is more a change "of an existing law than a change in the underlying foundation of belief"? I suppose it depends entirely on how we analyze the quoted text. And this goes to the heart of the controversy of what it means for an institution to change its position on some controversial subject.  In Lawrence, did the Court change its (or the Constitution's) position on homosexual sodomy or did it is merely accommodate the move in American law and society to recognize the liberty interests of gays and lesbians without altering the constitutional doctrine on this matter? (Just what would such a contrast mean in this context? Whatever the Court's reason, the doctrine is effectively changed, isn't it?) In order to answer this question the distinction between change or accommodation must be pellucid and viable. Obscuring the contrast or making it virtually impossible to identify one or the other side of the contrast inhibits our ability to raise the question in the first instance.

Bobby Lipkin
Widener University School of Law
Delaware