Re: "Agenda" and persecution of Mormons

[Robert Justin Lipkin]

       The recent thread concerning the change in the LDS Church regarding polygamy--and let's be precise, it was polygamy not merely plural marriages-raises critically important questions about constitutional, moral, political, social, and personal change.  (For example, change is central to the identity of traditions upon which constitutional law, in some sense, rests.) One might describe these questions more generally as questions about  theoretical and practical change--changes in judgments (beliefs, convictions, positions, and so forth) as well as changes in conduct (action, intention, decision, and so forth). Some of the important questions in this domain are: (1) What counts as a change? (a) Must the change be self-conscious? (b) Must it be permanent or at least intended to be permanent? (c) If permanence, or the intent to be permanent, is required, how do we know when such a change is permanent? If so, how do we acquire this knowledge? (2) In institutional contexts, who speaks for the institution? Its leaders? The members?  (a) What happens if leaders and members disagree? (b) Must there be a process which serves as both a necessary and sufficient condition for institutional change? (c) Is so, shouldn't we conclude that non-canonical changes suggest a change in the institution, not just its judgments or conduct?

       I do not think the above exhausts all possibilities; indeed, I'm pretty certain additional questions will easily come to mind. One final point about the LDS Church and polygamy: Many different conceptions of change are possible, but I would suggest that restrictive conceptions of change--for example conceptions requiring that the change (or the intent to change) be permanent --unduly distort the critically important phenomenon of change, and therefore, hamper our understanding how people and institutions operate.

Bobby Lipkin
Widener University School of Law
Delaware