Re: CDemocracy and Republicanism Historically and Normatively

[Robert Justin Lipkin]

       Thanks to the members of the list who have generously responded to my requests. As you will see, I am genuinely confused about the historical and normative analysis of 'democracy' and 'republicanism.'

       One problem I'm facing in trying to understand the Founding generation's conception of democracy is this.  Today, it seems that democracy covers a wide spectrum of related ideas from virtually unconstrained majoritarianism to more complex conceptions invoking such political and moral concepts as equality, self-determination, deliberation, representation, and so forth, And these additional features of democracy provide an explanation of 'democracy' and accordingly can be redescribed as canonical elements in the conception of 'democracy' itself.

       If today no one would embrace the Founding conception of 'democracy' because it is an impoverished conception of self-rule, then it isn't terribly interesting if the Founding  generation rejected that conception of democracy. If our present conception of 'democracy' is richer and more complex than the Founders,' the historical question seem to be whether the Founders would have rejected our conception of 'democracy.' If not, why should we care about an impoverished sense of democracy that the Founders rejected?

       I suppose the link between democracy and republicanism is self-rule, and the spectrum of conceptions of self-rule begins with direct (virtually) unconstrained majoritarianism and leads to a conception of (republican) self-rule containing several important constraints on majoritarianism. But then the contrast between republicanism and democracy is stark only when democracy is interpreted as direct, unconstrained majoritarianism. If few theorists today embrace this sense of democracy, the contrast between democracy and republicanism ceases to be very interesting.  Both democracy and republicanism may include such constraints or filters as representationalism, deliberation, a concern about the common good, and so forth. Given the elasticity in the term 'democracy,' it is absolutely necessary as both a historical matter and a normative matter to define the term as precisely as possible when answering whether the Framers conceptually rejected the concept of 'democracy' as well as whether democracy is superior to 'republicanism.'

Bobby Lipkin
Widener University School of Law
Delaware