Prof. Lipkin is clear right to focus on the meaning
of the words used before assuming that any prior person or set of persons has
discussed a now relevant concept. My (non expert) recollection is that in
Athens, democracy included giving out most offices by lot-- on the assumption
that any citizen (a rather limited group) would be able to fulfill the office.
Voting for candidate was considered insufficiently democratic.
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2003 7:27
AM
Subject: Re: CDemocracy and Republicanism
Historically and Normatively
Thanks to the
members of the list who have generously responded to my requests. As you will
see, I am genuinely confused about the historical and normative analysis of
'democracy' and 'republicanism.'
One problem I'm facing in trying to understand the Founding generation's
conception of democracy is this. Today, it seems that democracy covers a
wide spectrum of related ideas from virtually unconstrained majoritarianism to
more complex conceptions invoking such political and moral concepts as
equality, self-determination, deliberation, representation, and so forth, And
these additional features of democracy provide an explanation of 'democracy'
and accordingly can be redescribed as canonical elements in the conception of
'democracy' itself.
If today no
one would embrace the Founding conception of 'democracy' because it is an
impoverished conception of self-rule, then it isn't terribly interesting if
the Founding generation rejected that conception of democracy. If
our present conception of 'democracy' is richer and more complex than the
Founders,' the historical question seem to be whether the Founders would have
rejected our conception of 'democracy.' If not, why should we care about an
impoverished sense of democracy that the Founders
rejected?
I suppose the link
between democracy and republicanism is self-rule, and the spectrum of
conceptions of self-rule begins with direct (virtually) unconstrained
majoritarianism and leads to a conception of (republican) self-rule containing
several important constraints on majoritarianism. But then the contrast
between republicanism and democracy is stark only when democracy is
interpreted as direct, unconstrained majoritarianism. If few theorists today
embrace this sense of democracy, the contrast between democracy and
republicanism ceases to be very interesting. Both democracy and
republicanism may include such constraints or filters as representationalism,
deliberation, a concern about the common good, and so forth. Given the
elasticity in the term 'democracy,' it is absolutely necessary as both a
historical matter and a normative matter to define the term as precisely as
possible when answering whether the Framers conceptually rejected the
concept of 'democracy' as well as whether democracy is superior to
'republicanism.'
Bobby Lipkin Widener University School of
Law Delaware
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