Bobby has raised exactly the sort of question that this list exists to
discuss: "What purposes does (or ought) the U.S. Constitution exist to
serve?" and "what vocabulary best captures those purposes?"
Collective "self-rule" may well be useful description of what the U.S. (and
other) constitutions ought to achieve. I prefer the framers' vocabulary only
because I understand it better.
If one accepts that all collective decisions in large political groups involve
overriding minority views, then basing a constitutional theory on the
importance of "self-rule" will require explaining the sense in which
overridden minorities still enjoy "self-rule". I am not suggesting that this
is not a worthwhile project, but rather inviting someone to take a stab at
describing the nature and purpose of collective self-rule as a constitutional
value. (I think that I remember a previous thread on this list in which it
was proposed that "self-rule" might be analogous to "self-determination" under
international law, but proponents of the concept of "self-rule" insisted on a
difference.)
"Liberty" strikes me as a more useful and important concept than "self-rule"
both historically, and as a matter of constitutional morality. One can lose a
vote under a just constitution, without losing one's liberty.
Tim Sellers
>===== Original Message From Discussion list for con law professors
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> =====
> To say that "self-rule" potentially serves as a concept unifying
>individual self-rule and collective self-rule does not in any way imply that
there
>are no differences in how these concepts work. As a unifying concept
>"self-rule" suggests important similarities not identities.
>
> Different linguistic intuitions are surely at work here. "[T]he
>absence of internal domination" tells me very little. While not pellucid to
be sure,
>"self-rule" indicates a subject (an individual person or group of people) who
>decide things for themselves. I agree that far from ending the investigation
>about democracy or republicanism, the use of self-rule only begins it. But
it
>begins it, I submit, by using a paradigm of individual self-rule which is
>relatively clear and then proceeds to develop a similar conception of
collective
>self-rule. This is a rather straightforward method of theory construction.
>That problems arise in developing this second related concept should be
>welcomed. Attempting to answer these problems elucidates the paradigm even
further.
>I'm afraid I would not welcome the task of unpacking "the absence of internal
>domination." This locution raises a host of questions that are probably more
>usefully addressed later in the development of a political philosophy. But,
as I
>said, linguistic intuitions differ.
>
>Bobby Lipkin
>Widener University School of Law
>Delaware
