Prof. Swaine writes: "Whether and how GA resolutions contribute to customary international law is actually quite controversial among international lawyers, as is whether a particular state's acceptance of a resolution makes a difference (putting aside the possibility of persistent objection to the underlying norm). In my view, a particular vote for a GA resolution, which is clearly non-binding in and of itself and would be understood as such by the voting state, could tip the scales in favor of a binding norm against it only in extraordinary circumstances. Mr. Martin may be depending on the exceptional fact that the resolution in question was particular or regional in character (i.e., dealing with U.S. territory), and thus *might* bind the state(s) especially implicated and voting in favor of it. But that's different than GA resolutions of general application, which may be what prompted the previous poster's concern. Errr, with respect to the weight! given such resolutions by Article III courts, esp. as to questions of U.S. constitutional law, I add for sake of topicality."
Comment: Generally speaking, I agree that there is debate about the legal effect of GA resolutions. That is why I said that such resolutions are EVIDENCE of customary international law. The Second Circuit in Filartiga recognized that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (a GA resolution) was evidence of customary international law. Furthermore, ICJ has opined that GA resolutions addressing self-determination do have legal effect. See Namibia Advisory Opinion. Francisco Forrest Martin
