Re: self-rule

[Robert Justin Lipkin]

       The question of explaining "the sense in which overridden minorities still enjoy" freedom is endemic to any theory of democracy/republicanism/liberty or even the "absence of internal domination." Whenever less than a unanimous vote is concerned, how can the losers be described as engaging in self-rule, as being free, or as living in the absence of internal domination?  And, of course, consent theory generally addresses this question. John Locke raised this issue without ever mentioning "self-rule," I think. The problem of explaining the role of political minorities in either democracies or republics is fundamental, but it is hardly a problem only for those of us who embrace self-rule as the concept underlying democracy and republicanism. 

       Incidentally, Habermas, Michelman, and Tushnet (Tushnet most recently in a symposium on democracy and judicial review in Law and Philosophy) among others have raised the question of minority status in democracies.  Tim is right in emphasizing its critical importance to any theory of self-rule (whoops, there I go again).

Bobby Lipkin
Widener University School of Law
Delaware