Sandy is correct to state that federal funds for a localized disaster violates the original understanding of the 'general welfare' clause, as evidenced by the belief by a prevailing majority in Congress that it had no constitutional authority to come to the aid of Savannah after a fire destroyed that city.
We discussed this very question at length at the Spending Clause Symposium a few years ago at Chapman Law School. Interestingly, Richard Epstein suggested (during the discussion, not in his published article, which was on standing doctrine) that there might well be a difference between after-the-fact aid, which benefited only a single locale, and an a priori insurance package, which is something like what we now have with FEMA. True, the private insurance market would probably allocate risk better, but some of the "premium differential" that the private market would impose is already being paid by California, in a way, in the form of a greater differential between taxes paid FROM Californians to federal dollars received BY California than exists in many other states. If it was truly run like a national insurance program, with different "premiums" for different risks (how many times are we going to pay for the rebuilding of fancy homes on the outer banks of North Carolina, for example?), then it might qualify as a valid "general welfare" expenditure. Anyone interested in more on this debate, the entire Symposium issue is available at http://www.chapman.edu/law/students/volume4.html Cheers, John Eastman -----Original Message----- From: Sanford Levinson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2003 12:41 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: WELFARE, FOREST FIRES, AND THE CONSTITUTION I am genuinely curious as to how political and constitutional conservatives justify taxing national taxpayers in order to pay for eminently foreseeable disasters in California. (I keep hearing that these are the most serious forest fires in ten years. One of the things this tells me is that a lot of California is built on the equivalent of ten-year flood plains. Isn't this really quite irrational, and shouldn't people who do such things be responsible for purchasing insurance from the private market. Isn't federal insurance at below-market rates simply an invitation to moral hazard?) Is there any "general welfare" argument, say, for using federal funds to rebuild homes in Malibu, etc.? This is, of course, related not only to the Lochner thread, but to the more fundamental issue, as argued by Michelle Landis Dauber in two brilliant articles, that there is no self-evident way to distinguish between "natural disasters" and "misfortunes that are the fault of the victims." Why, for example, do conservatives assume that California deserves aid and, say, victims of structural unemplyment should be left to the vagaries of the market and private charity? I assure you this is not only a polemical question. David Currie has some fascinating discussions in his landmark study of The Constitution in Congress about the tense debates in the early 19th century about the propriety of using federal funds to help rebuild Savannah and Alexandria after fires. Does "general welfare" mean just whatever a majority of Congress decide it is, or is there some independent way of saying that A is "truly" in the general welfare and B is "really" unconstitutional rent-seeking. I suppose it doesn't go without saying that I am truly appalled by the devastation in California and at the suffering it has generated. But, after all, Harry Blackmun earned the scorn of many right-minded people (pun intended) for his sentimental reference to "Poor Joshua." What's the difference with "Poor Californians?" sandy
