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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-3578?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12605866#action_12605866
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Devaraj Das commented on HADOOP-3578:
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If the JobTracker is the only one writing to a private location then it can
take care of this situation. For e.g., the JobTracker could create directories
with a different name for each job (even from the same user).
The problem with having the user-dir is that we need to make sure that over
time garbage doesn't accumulate. If we put the onus on the user to clear the
garbage, how does the user know for sure the jobtracker has copied the stuff
over (this is one thing we need to worry about especially with restartability
of jobtracker).
To be absolutely sure that there are no security loopholes (for e.g. don't
allow other users to even look at the job.xml of my job), the proposal of
sending stuff over rpc makes sense. Of course, we need to fix other things like
the webUI (authenticate the user before allowing him to view the job details)
to make this a reality.
> mapred.system.dir should be accessible only to hadoop daemons
> --------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: HADOOP-3578
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-3578
> Project: Hadoop Core
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: mapred
> Reporter: Amar Kamat
>
> Currently the jobclient accesses the {{mapred.system.dir}} to add job
> details. Hence the {{mapred.system.dir}} has the permissions of
> {{rwx-wx-wx}}. This could be a security loophole where the job files might
> get overwritten/tampered after the job submission.
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