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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-3578?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12606636#action_12606636
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Amar Kamat commented on HADOOP-3578:
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Consider the following approach
1) The client submits to a *mapred.submit.dir* directory which has the
_rwx-w--w-_ permission. The job-id that the JT creates contains some random
component per job which would make guessing difficult.
2) The JT moves the job (details) from the *mapred.submit.dir* to the
*mapred.system.dir* which is now with _rwx------_ permission.
This decreases the vulnerability to the window between job submission and job
acceptance. Once the job is accepted by the jobtracker, it cant be tampered,
even if the job name is known.
> mapred.system.dir should be accessible only to hadoop daemons
> --------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: HADOOP-3578
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-3578
> Project: Hadoop Core
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: mapred
> Reporter: Amar Kamat
>
> Currently the jobclient accesses the {{mapred.system.dir}} to add job
> details. Hence the {{mapred.system.dir}} has the permissions of
> {{rwx-wx-wx}}. This could be a security loophole where the job files might
> get overwritten/tampered after the job submission.
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