On Dec 16, 2003, at 5:14 PM, David Wagner wrote:

Jerrold Leichter wrote:
We've met the enemy, and he is us. *Any* secure computing kernel that can do
the kinds of things we want out of secure computing kernels, can also do the
kinds of things we *don't* want out of secure computing kernels.

I don't understand why you say that. You can build perfectly good secure computing kernels that don't contain any support for remote attribution. It's all about who has control, isn't it?

There is no control of your system with remote attestation. Remote attestation simply allows the distant end of a communication to determine if your configuration is acceptable for them to communicate with you. As such, remote attestation allows communicating parties to determine with whom they communicate or share services. In that respect, it is just like caller id. People should be able to either attest remotely, or block it just like caller id. Just as the distant end can choose to accept or not accept the connection.

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