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• • Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI David Wagner
  • Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI David Wagner
  • Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI Ian G
• how to encrypt and integrity-check with only one key Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: how to encrypt and integrity-check with only one key Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: how to encrypt and integrity-check with only one key David-Sarah Hopwood
• UK Prime Minister apologizes for Alan Turing's mistreatment. Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: UK Prime Minister apologizes for Alan Turing's mistreatment. Stephan Somogyi
• Google Plans Tools to Help News Media Charge for Content R.A. Hettinga
• Privacy Plug-In Fakes out Facebook R.A. Hettinga
  • Re: Privacy Plug-In Fakes out Facebook Ali, Saqib
  • Re: Privacy Plug-In Fakes out Facebook Adam Shostack
• Serpent close to AES speed thanks to SSE2 Eugen Leitl
• NSA intercepts led to a terrorist conviction Steven Bellovin
• [fc-announce] Financial Crypto and Data Security 2010: speakers and workshops [submission deadline: September 15, 2009] R.A. Hettinga
• so how do *you* manage your keys, then? part 3 Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: so how do *you* manage your keys, then? part 3 Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm priya yelgar
  • Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Nicolas Williams
  • Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Jack Lloyd
  • Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm David Johnston
  • Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Peter Gutmann
  • Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Damien Miller
  • Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Peter Gutmann
  • Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Damien Miller
  • Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Matt Ball
• "Fed's RFIDiocy pwnd at DefCon" Jerry Leichter
  • Re: "Fed's RFIDiocy pwnd at DefCon" Matt Crawford
  • Re: "Fed's RFIDiocy pwnd at DefCon" Jerry Leichter
• Re: AES-GMAC as a hash "Hal Finney"
  • Re: AES-GMAC as a hash Darren J Moffat
• Source for Skype Trojan released Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Source for Skype Trojan released Stephan Neuhaus
  • Re: Source for Skype Trojan released Dave Howe
• Fwd: [Macgpg-users] GPGMail & Snow Leopard R.A. Hettinga
  • Re: [Macgpg-users] GPGMail & Snow Leopard David Shaw
• Fwd: Important Information for PGP® Desktop Use rs Running Mac OS X R.A. Hettinga
• "Defending Against Sensor-Sniffing Attacks on Mobile Phones" Jerry Leichter
• Practical attack on WPA? Jerry Leichter
• Cloud Security: Alice and Bob Go to Washington R.A. Hettinga
• Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Brian Warner
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Michael Walsh
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Brian Warner
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP James A. Donald
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Brian Warner
  • Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Ivan Krstić
  • Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP James A. Donald
  • Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Ivan Krstić
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Brian Warner
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Alexandre Dulaunoy
  • Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Alexandre Dulaunoy
• a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Richard Salz
  • Re: a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Jerry Leichter
  • AES-GMAC as a hash Darren J Moffat
  • Re: AES-GMAC as a hash Matt Ball
  • Re: [cryptography] AES-GMAC as a hash Eric Young
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility James A. Donald
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• Re: Certainty "Hal Finney"
  • Re: Certainty Perry E. Metzger
• Small-key DSA variant "Hal Finney"
• NIST Requests Public Comments Perry E. Metzger
• Crypto '09 rump session summary? Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Crypto '09 rump session summary? Greg Rose
  • Re: Crypto '09 rump session summary? Paul Hoffman
• 2 serving time in UK prisons for refusing to decrypt on demand John Gilmore
• 512 bit RSA key used for TI 83+ auth cracked Jack Lloyd
• Re: Seizing the Enigma John Levine
• Crypto'09 Rump session to be webcast james hughes
  • Re: Crypto'09 Rump session to be webcast james hughes
• Kahn's "Seizing the Enigma" back in print -- with a catch Steven Bellovin
  • Re: Kahn's "Seizing the Enigma" back in print -- with a catch John Levine
• Re: brute force physics Was: cleversafe... David Wagner
  • Re: brute force physics Was: cleversafe... Florian Weimer
• Ultimate limits to computation "Hal Finney"
  • Re: Ultimate limits to computation Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Ultimate limits to computation Your Monkey Overlord
• Entropy USB key Alex Pankratov
• All your notebook belong to us Jerry Leichter
• ANNOUNCE: New book on software protection Christian Collberg
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Ben Laurie
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? [OT anonymous-transaction bull***t] Ray Dillinger
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? -- OT anonymous-transaction Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Ben Laurie
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Steven Bellovin
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Nicolas Williams
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Steven Bellovin
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Wes Felter
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Frank Siebenlist
  • RE: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Thomas Hardjono
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • RE: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Thomas Hardjono
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Stefan Santesson
  • Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
• Re: Malware using good crypto mhey...@gmail.com
• Vulnerable keyboards Jerry Leichter
• New Attacks against AES-256 I)ruid
  • Re: New Attacks against AES-256 Robert Holmes
• GPGPU MD5 collision search shown at Black Hat Perry E. Metzger
• ANNOUNCING Tahoe, the Lofty-Atmospheric Filesystem, v1.5 Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• AES, RC4 PETER SCHWEITZER
  • Re: AES, RC4 Joseph Ashwood
• Manipulation and abuse of the consumer credit reporting agencies Jerry Leichter
• The clouds are not random enough Ali, Saqib
  • Re: The clouds are not random enough Jerry Leichter
  • Re: The clouds are not random enough Ben Laurie
  • Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Arshad Noor
  • Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Richard Salz
  • Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Arshad Noor
  • Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Richard Salz
  • Re: Unattended reboots james hughes
  • Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) lists
  • Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Darren J Moffat
  • Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Ali, Saqib
  • Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Philipp Gühring
  • Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Peter Gutmann
  • Re: unattended reboot (was: clouds ...) John Denker
• A Basic Rabin-Williams Digital Signature Specification Thierry Moreau
  • Re (security fix): A Basic Rabin-Williams Digital Signature Specification Thierry Moreau
• ADMIN: slight list hiccup today Perry E. Metzger
• The latest Flash vulnerability and monoculture Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: The latest Flash vulnerability and monoculture Jerry Leichter
  • Re: The latest Flash vulnerability and monoculture Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: The latest Flash vulnerability and monoculture Jerry Leichter
  • Re: The latest Flash vulnerability and monoculture Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: The latest Flash vulnerability and monoculture Peter Gutmann
  • Re: The latest Flash vulnerability and monoculture John Gilmore
  • Re: The latest Flash vulnerability and monoculture Peter Gutmann
  • Re: The latest Flash vulnerability and monoculture dan
• NIST announces SHA-3 round 2 candidates Jack Lloyd
• cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated james hughes
  • Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Jerry Leichter
  • Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Ben Laurie
  • Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated james hughes
  • Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Jerry Leichter
  • brute force physics Was: cleversafe... Alexander Klimov
  • Re: brute force physics Was: cleversafe... Jerry Leichter
  • Re: brute force physics Was: cleversafe... Alexander Klimov
  • RE: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Jason Resch
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • RE: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Jason Resch
  • RE: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Jason Resch
  • strong claims about encryption safety Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • RE: strong claims about encryption safety Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Jason Resch
  • So how do *you* manage your keys, then? Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git Jack Lloyd
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git James A. Donald
  • SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Perry E. Metzger
  • Certainty Paul Hoffman
  • Re: Certainty Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Certainty james hughes
  • Re: Certainty Greg Rose
  • Re: Certainty Paul Hoffman
  • Re: Certainty John Gilmore
  • Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Ben Laurie
  • Re: SHA-1 and Git Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: SHA-1 and Git Paul Hoffman
  • Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Darren J Moffat
  • Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Nicolas Williams
  • Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) James A. Donald
  • Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Jon Callas

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