On Jan 12, 2008 9:32 AM, Alex Alten <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Generally any standard encrypted protocols will probably eventually have > to support some sort of CALEA capability. ...
That's a rather large and distinctly dangerous assumption. Here's the IETF's official line on the question, the "abstract" section of RFC 2084: The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has been asked to take a position on the inclusion into IETF standards-track documents of functionality designed to facilitate wiretapping. This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why its answer is "no", and what that answer means. http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2804.html The whole question was extensively discussed on an IETF mailing list set up for the purpose before that RFC was written: http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/raven/current/index.html The aptly named RFC 1984 is also relevant. Among the more obvious problems are the fact that complexity is bad for security, that the US government has some history of abusing wiretaps, and that other governments who would have access to any such technology are even less trustworthy. -- Sandy Harris, Nanjing, China --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
