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• • Re: Anyone know anything about the new AT&T encrypted voice service? Adam Shostack
• English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Ray Dillinger
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Marsh Ray
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Christoph Gruber
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Jerry Leichter
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Bernie Cosell
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Nicolas Williams
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Marsh Ray
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Jerry Leichter
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Ben Laurie
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Joss Wright
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Arshad Noor
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key silky
  • Re: English 19-year-old jailed for refusal to disclose decryption key Samuel Weiler
• Computer "health certificate" plan indistinguishable from Denial Of Service attack. Ray Dillinger
  • Re: Computer "health certificate" plan: Charney of DoJ/MS John Gilmore
  • Re: Computer "health certificate" plan indistinguishable from Denial Of Service attack. Michael P. Soulier
  • Re: Computer "health certificate" plan indistinguishable from Denial Of Service attack. Kent Yoder
• FY;) Stick Figure Guide to AES Eugen Leitl
• Tahoe-LAFS developers' statement on backdoors Zooko O'Whielacronx
• Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic Jack Lloyd
  • Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic Simon Josefsson
  • Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic Victor Duchovni
  • Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic Matt Crawford
  • Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic Peter Gutmann
• ADMIN: Don't Top Post. Trim Quoted Material. Perry E. Metzger
• Wrong Direction on Privacy - using NSLs to obtain communication transactional information =JeffH
• [tt] Random numbers created out of nothing Eugen Leitl
  • Re: [tt] Random numbers created out of nothing Eugen Leitl
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Chris Palmer
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Steven Bellovin
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Marsh Ray
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Paul Wouters
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] James Muir
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Samuel Neves
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Jack Lloyd
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Samuel Neves
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Victor Duchovni
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Samuel Neves
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Chris Palmer
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] James A. Donald
  • Re: 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [r...@openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits] Kevin W. Wall
• Stanford 10/7/2010 -- Lessons from the Haystack Affair Bill Stewart
• Obama administration wants encryption backdoors for domestic surveillance David G. Koontz
  • Re: Obama administration wants encryption backdoors for domestic surveillance dan
• Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO Eugen Leitl
• Certificate-stealing Trojan Steven Bellovin
  • Re: Certificate-stealing Trojan Rose, Greg
  • Re: Certificate-stealing Trojan Marsh Ray
  • Re: Certificate-stealing Trojan Thierry Moreau
• ANNOUNCING Tahoe, the Least-Authority File System, v1.8.0 Zooko O'Whielacronx
• [sp...@cs.stevens.edu: WECSR 2011 CFP - Deadline Oct 15, 2010 - please disseminate] R. Hirschfeld
• ciphers with keys modifying control flow? Steven Bellovin
  • Re: ciphers with keys modifying control flow? Jerry Leichter
  • Re: ciphers with keys modifying control flow? Florian Weimer
• Czech intel agency allegedly offered "tax free cash" to local crypto vendor to incorporate defects Matt Blaze
• Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans Perry E. Metzger
  • The Demise of the Trusted Third Party Fallacy M.R.
  • Re: Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans David G. Koontz
  • Re: Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans Florian Weimer
  • Re: Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans Josh Rubin
  • Re: Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans Ken Buchanan
• Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have Steven Bellovin
  • Re: Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have John Gilmore
  • Re: Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have Sean Donelan
  • Re: Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have Bernie Cosell
• More on padding oracles Peter Gutmann
• ADMIN: Heavy-handed moderation Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III Peter Gutmann
  • Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III Andy Steingruebl
  • Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III James A. Donald
  • RE: A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III Carl Ellison
• HDCP master key supposedly leaked Steven Bellovin
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys Ben Laurie
  • Re: Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
  • Re: Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys Werner Koch
  • Re: Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys Perry E. Metzger
  • Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes Paul Hoffman
  • Re: Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes Paul Hoffman
• Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86 John Gilmore
  • Re: Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86 Ben Laurie
  • Re: Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86 Peter Gutmann
  • RE: Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86 ian.farquhar
  • Re: Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86 David G. Koontz
  • Re: Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86 Bill Frantz
  • Re: Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86 Steven Bellovin
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps =JeffH
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Peter Gutmann
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Tom Ritter
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Peter Gutmann
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Thai Duong
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Thai Duong
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Thai Duong
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Kevin W. Wall
  • RE: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Brad Hill
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Richard Outerbridge
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Jerry Leichter
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Peter Gutmann
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Kevin W. Wall
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Richard Outerbridge
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps James A. Donald
  • Re: 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Kevin W. Wall
• Fwd: [ PRIVACY Forum ] 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps Steven Bellovin
• more digitally-signed malware Steven Bellovin
• ADMIN: please do not "dual post" Perry E. Metzger
• Hashing algorithm needed flj
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Nicolas Williams
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Marsh Ray
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Ben Laurie
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed James A. Donald
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Ben Laurie
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Chris Palmer
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed flj
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Ian G
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Marsh Ray
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Ian G
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Ben Laurie
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Marsh Ray
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Nicolas Williams
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Ben Laurie
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Ben Laurie
  • Re: Hashing algorithm needed Erwan Legrand
• Fw: Request for Comments - NIST Draft SP 800-135: Recommendation for Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions Perry E. Metzger
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography John Denker
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography Marsh Ray
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography John Denker
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography John Denker
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography Marsh Ray
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography Marsh Ray
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography Victor Duchovni
• Nearly $1,000,000 stolen electronically from the University of Virginia Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: Nearly $1,000,000 stolen electronically from the University of Virginia Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• RSA question Justin Ferguson
  • Re: RSA question Alexander Klimov
  • Re: RSA question Justin Ferguson
  • Re: RSA question Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: RSA question Francois Grieu
  • Re: RSA question Bill Stewart
  • Re: RSA question travis+ml-cryptography
  • Re: RSA question Sampo Syreeni
  • Re: RSA question Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: RSA question Victor Duchovni
  • Re: RSA question Steven Bellovin
  • Re: RSA question Francois Grieu
  • Re: RSA question Francois Grieu
  • Re: RSA question Perry E. Metzger
• Lasers crack commercial encryption systems mhey...@gmail.com
• Overclocking TLS/SSL (was: towards https everywhere and strict transport security) =JeffH
• Transport-level encryption with Tcpcrypt Sean McGrath
• questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 travis+ml-cryptography
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Steven Bellovin
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Jerry Leichter
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 travis+ml-cryptography
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Eric Murray
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Nicolas Williams
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Thierry Moreau
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Eric Murray
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Nicolas Williams
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Peter Gutmann
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Joshua Hill
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Peter Gutmann
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Joshua Hill
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Peter Gutmann
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Nicolas Williams
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Ben Laurie
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Thierry Moreau
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Thomas
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 John Denker
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Peter Gutmann
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Jerry Leichter
  • Re: Is determinism a good idea? WAS: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Thierry Moreau
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Alexander Klimov
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 travis+ml-cryptography
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 dj
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Werner Koch
  • Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140 Peter Gutmann
• Haystack redux Katrin Verclas

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