I think that is a rather naive assessment. Most of us do not want to be dependent on a single root of trust that is ultimately under the physical control of VeriSign and the legal control of ICANN, a body whose insistence that it is above criticism should be deeply troubling. Attempts to concentrate trust in one place have invariably proved to be unstable.
DLV is not the solution but it may be a useful contribution to a solution. On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Paul Wouters <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sun, 14 Oct 2012, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > For DANE, presumably solutions would use some form of DNSSEC rewriting, >> with DLV >> > > That's not the purpose of DLV. DLV is going to die sooner rather then > later, > and no infrastructure should be build up to use it for such purpose. > > I hope the operator of the DLV registry will confirm this in strong terms. > > Paul > > ______________________________**_________________ > dane mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/dane<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane> > -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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