On 16 October 2012 15:48, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> wrote: > I think that is a rather naive assessment. > > Most of us do not want to be dependent on a single root of trust that is > ultimately under the physical control of VeriSign and the legal control of > ICANN, a body whose insistence that it is above criticism should be deeply > troubling. Attempts to concentrate trust in one place have invariably proved > to be unstable. > > DLV is not the solution but it may be a useful contribution to a solution.
How about a solution that doesn't require you to trust anyone - namely Certificate Transparency? > > > > > On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Paul Wouters <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> On Sun, 14 Oct 2012, Ryan Sleevi wrote: >> >>> For DANE, presumably solutions would use some form of DNSSEC rewriting, >>> with DLV >> >> >> That's not the purpose of DLV. DLV is going to die sooner rather then >> later, >> and no infrastructure should be build up to use it for such purpose. >> >> I hope the operator of the DLV registry will confirm this in strong terms. >> >> Paul >> >> _______________________________________________ >> dane mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane > > > > > -- > Website: http://hallambaker.com/ > > > _______________________________________________ > dane mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane > _______________________________________________ dane mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
