On Sat Apr 18 03:25:47 2015 GMT+0100, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > On Sat, Apr 18, 2015 at 12:10:55AM +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > On 17/04/15 17:39, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > > > > Well, though I don't know why we'd care protecting about the address > > > records also (given routing layer attacks), ... There is (full > > > disclosure) a corner case where the address records are not secure, > > > but the TLSA records are. > > > > Right, that's what I was wondering about. > > Almost no domains lie in this corner case. > > > I think the question for the WG is whether or not to > > note that that allows for potential traffic re-direction > > and traffic analysis of the TLS protected data. > > I don't see why opportunistic DANE TLS for SMTP should attempt to > protect against this "attack",
I wasn't arguing to protect against this but to document the security consideration. Sorry if that wasn't clear. And it's still ok if the wg prefer to not mention it. S. > which even mandatory TLS for HTTPS > ignores. The folks interested in traffic analysis will learn what > they need whether the IP addresses are forged or not. In fact I > rather doubt they'd want to be that visible just for traffic > analysis. > > > You are also correct that this could be done via BGP (and > > is perhaps more likely to be done) but if one was worried > > about this, then the error could also be done at this level > > (as shown by your example) which is an argument to call > > this out but not get into BGP issues. > > I'd prefer to not discuss this side-track in the draft. > > -- > Viktor. > > _______________________________________________ > dane mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane > _______________________________________________ dane mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
