Hi Ronald,

It is a matter of feasibility. In this context, at this layer of the
technology stack it is up to the database clients to filter out
information they do not consider of interest. The database is merely a
conduit between an authorized internet number resource holder and the
database clients.

I'll share a practical example of 'client side' filtering. Back in 2016
I helped coordinate an industry-wide efforts to rid the public BGP
Default-Free Zone of private ASNs.

https://ripe72.ripe.net/archives/video/193/
https://ripe72.ripe.net/presentations/151-RIPE72_bogon_ASNs_JobSnijders.pdf

I consider the campaign a success because nowadays private ASNs are
by-and-large unusable in context of public BGP routing. The creation of
easy to copy+paste config examples has further solidified the separation
between 'public' and 'private': 
https://bgpfilterguide.nlnog.net/guides/bogon_asns/

Drawing analogies between IRR and RPKI
======================================

The expectation is that RPKI will assume most functionality of IRR
databases over time. Thus, before proposing changes to any IRR system,
we have to consider the rules of its cryptographic sibling, the RPKI, as
that is the successor to IRR.

In the RPKI authorization model the equivalent of the "origin:"
attribute is defined as a positive integer [1] known as the 'ASId'. The
issuer of the ROA decides what numeric value the ASId is set to.

In many RPKI deployment scenarios it is *** technically impossible ***
for the RIR to impose restrictions on the content of the ASId field,
because the RIR is not involved in the issuance or publication of said
objects. It is up to the relaying party (aka the 'database client') to
discard objects which are not of interest because of local policy.

Do I tell people they might have misconfigured an IRR route object or RPKI ROA 
when I see it? Yes

Does IRRexplorer show warnings when private numbers are found in objects? Yes

Should RIPE NCC point out private values in objects during Assisted Registry 
Checks? Yes

Should BGP Default-Free Zone operators configure their routers to discard BGP 
UPDATE messages with private ASNs? Yes

Should the database server software impose brittle restrictions on that field? 
No, not worth the headache.

Kind regards,

Job

[1]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6482#section-3

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