Wouter Verhelst writes ("Re: TC nomination procedure v0"): > It's a vote that will have effect on the appointment of a person to the > TC. The constitution specifically wants appointment votes to be public. > Without wanting to comment on the letter, I think this is contrary to > the intent. > > To be clear, I also think the consitution is wrong to require that such > votes are public. I think the TC should not have to make appointments in > public, for the very same reason that we also have secret ballots on DPL > votes. However, I think the correct course of action here is not to > ignore the constitution and explain that by some clever choice of words, > but rather to amend the constitution to make it be in line with that > rationale.
I suppose it would be worth explaining why I drafted this the way I did, and what I intended. The current system, with a private process including non-binding filtering votes etc., followed by a public rubber stamp, is exactly what I had in mind, and I still think it is the best way. The reasons why most of the process has to be private are obvious. The reasons for the formal binding vote to be public are less so, it seems. So: In a situation where there is rough consensus and every TC member is content that the process is appropriate, then the public vote is indeed a formality. That's simply a reflection of consensus generated during the private discussion. Often some participants in that consensus might have preferred different candidate(s), considering the matter in a vacuum, but think it more imporant to not to do the inevitable public personalised discussion of possible appointments, than to force this issue. Such a TC member will vote with the rest of the committee in the formal public vote. That is fine. But: if there is a lack of consensus on process, or a TC member feels strongly enough to publicly dissent on a particular candidate, or whatever, it is vital that that such a TC member has a way to dissent which is simultaneously formally effective, and verifiable from outside the TC. And likewise, that TC members who vote to overrule a publicly dissenting member must do so in a way that is visible from outside. The alternative is a situation where, even when there is a serious disagreement, TC members can mislead outsiders about the ultimate position they took when the matter was finally decided by a vote. Luckily such misleading statements are (I think) hypothetical, but the question of dissent, and the need for formal public dissent, is not. Sam Hartman indeed abstained on a recent TC appointment vote out of unhappiness with the process. That is precisely the kind of thing that cannot be done if the final vote is secret. So that is why the private process within the TC must be ratified by a public vote. (And it also ensures that any votes or polls which take place in the private process are indicative, but are not binding on TC members in the final vote.) Ian.