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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12561099#action_12561099
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Daniel John Debrunner commented on DERBY-2109:
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> The javadoc for UserAuthenticator states the rules for mapping the userName
> onto the value of SYSSCHEMAS.AUTHORIZATIONID.
Which version (svn revision) are you looking at? I don't see the words
SYSSCHEMAS or AUTHORIZATIONID in the javadoc at all.
I do see this text in the section on stating how the userName is handled
"... within the Derby user authorization system"
revision 613345
That's doesn't state it's only for database authorization.
> However, the javadoc should probably punch up the significance of this
> behavior.
I entered DERBY-3334 to make this clearer.
Note the introduction to MyAuthenticationSchemeImpl says "very simple example"
:-)
It agrees with the discussion a few pages later
http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/dev/devguide/cdevcsecure24458.html
that says if the external scheme is case-sensitive (as in
MyAuthenticationSchemeImpl) then you must always log in with a user name that
maps to the value defined in the external scheme.
It remains silent on what to do if the external schema has different identities
that map to the same SQL identity, as you say that could be improved.
Later on in that page it says when talking about delimited identifiers:
"(Derby knows to remove the double quotes when passing the name to the
external authentication system.)"
I don't believe that's true, at least it contradicts UserAuthenticator's
documentation.
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.1.4
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Assignee: Martin Zaun
> Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat,
> derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff, DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat,
> DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat, DERBY-2109-07.diff,
> DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat,
> DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat,
> SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html,
> systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
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